The US Supreme Court will hear oral arguments by telephone conference on May 4, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 13 in a limited number of previously postponed cases. The following cases will be assigned argument dates after the Clerk’s Office has confirmed the availability of counsel:
18-9526, McGirt v. Oklahoma 19-46, United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V. 19-177, Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. 19-267, Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, and 19-348, St. James School v. Biel 19-431, Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, and 19-454, Trump v. Pennsylvania 19-465, Chiafalo v. Washington 19-518, Colorado Department of State v. Baca 19-631, Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. 19-635, Trump v. Vance 19-715, Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, and 19-760, Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG
In keeping with public health guidance in response to COVID-19, the Justices and counsel will all participate remotely. The Court anticipates providing a live audio feed of these arguments to news media. Details will be shared as they become available.
The Court Building remains open for official business, but most Court personnel are teleworking. The Court Building remains closed to the public until further notice.
The Court will use a teleconferencing system that will call counsel the morning of argument. All counsel for the cases to be argued that day will be called simultaneously at approximately 9:15 a.m. and will all be placed on a conference call with the Clerk of the Court, Scott Harris, to receive any last-minute instructions and to ask any remaining questions they may have. Once that briefing is completed, the phone lines for counsel will be muted, and counsel will remain on this same line until approximately 9:50 a.m. At that time, counsel will all be moved to the main conference call to await the beginning of argument.
At 10 a.m., the Justices will enter the main conference call, and the Marshal of the Court, Pamela Talkin, will cry the Court. The Chief Justice will call the first case, and he will acknowledge the first counsel to argue. Following the usual practice, the Court generally will not question lead counsel for petitioners and respondents during the first two minutes of argument. Where argument is divided and counsel represents an amicus or an additional party, the Court generally will not ask questions for one minute. At the end of this time, the Chief Justice will have the opportunity to ask questions. When his initial questioning is complete, the Associate Justices will then have the opportunity to ask questions in turn in order of seniority. If there is time remaining once all Justices have had the opportunity to question counsel, there may be additional questioning.
Once the time for the first counsel’s argument has expired, the Chief Justice will thank counsel for their argument, and acknowledge the next attorney. This process will continue until argument in the case is complete. Counsel for the petitioner in each case will be allotted three minutes for rebuttal. If there is a second case to be argued that day, the Chief Justice will call that case promptly after the end of the first argument, and the same process will be followed. The Marshal will announce the conclusion of arguments.
Monday, May 4: Booking.com trademark
10 a.m. ET: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.
Summary: Generic terms cannot be trademarked, but Booking.com wants to trademark its name.This case is about whether generic terms can become protected trademarks by the addition of a generic “.com” domain.
Attorneys: Government attorney Erica Ross, Booking.com attorney Lisa Blatt.
Tuesday, May 5: Aid for HIV program
10 a.m.. ET: USAID v. Alliance for Open Society International
Summary: A new twist on an old case. In 2013, the justices said the government had violated the First Amendment by making funding for U.S. nonprofits contingent on those nonprofits trumpeting the government’s policy position on key issues. The case is back, but this time the question before the court is whether it’s unconstitutional if the government makes funding contingent for foreign-based affiliates of those same U.S. nonprofits.
Wednesday, May 6: Birth control access & Robocalls
10 a.m.ET: Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania consolidated with Trump v. Pennsylvania
Summary: The court considers a Trump administration rule that would allow employers with religious or moral objections to birth control to limit their employees’ access to free birth control under the Affordable Care Act.
11 a.m. ET:Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants
Summary: In 1991, Congress passed a law that prohibits most robocalls. In 2015, Congress created an exception for government debt collection. Political groups, which want to use robocalls to raise money and turn out voters, are challenging the act as a violation of their First Amendment free speech rights.
Monday, May 11: Native American land & Religious freedom
10 a.m. ET:McGirt v. Oklahoma
Summary: On the surface, this case is about whether states, like Oklahoma, can prosecute members of Native American tribes for crimes committed in the historical bounds of tribal land. But it has implications for state power over thousands of miles of land in Oklahoma that has historically belonged to Creek, Cherokee, Seminole, Chickasaw and Choctaw tribes.
11 a.m.ET: Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru consolidated with St. James School v. Biel
Summary: A freedom of religion case that tests whether lay teachers at parochial schools are protected by federal laws barring discrimination based on race, gender, age and disability; or whether, as the schools here maintain, their lay teachers are exempt from the protection of those laws. The case has potential implications for the millions of Americans employed not just by parochial schools but also by religiously affiliated hospitals, charities and universities.
Tuesday, May 12: Trump finances
10 a.m. ET: Trump v. Mazars consolidated with Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG; Trump v. Vance
Summary: These cases involve subpoenas for some of Trump’s pre-presidential financial records. Two consolidated cases — Trump v. Mazars and Trump v. Deutsche Bank — ask whether Congress has the power to subpoena the president’s personal records except during an impeachment proceeding; Trump v. Vance addresses a New York grand jury subpoena for those same records in the course of a criminal investigation.
Wednesday, May 13: Faithless electors
10 a.m. ET: Chiafalo v. Washington; Colorado Department of State v. Baca
Summary: Both cases involve so-called faithless electors — Electoral College delegates who fail to vote for the presidential candidate they were pledged to support. At issue is whether states can punish or remove such electors in order to ensure that the state’s electors accurately represent the state’s vote.
Justices: Stephen J. Markman, Brian K. Zahra, Richard H. Bernstein, Elizabeth T. Clement, Megan K. Cavanagh
Reporter of Decisions: Kathryn L. Loomis
Docket No. 158311. Argued on application for leave to appeal October 3, 2019. Decided April 27, 2020.
Syllabus
Christie DeRuiter, a registered qualifying medical marijuana patient and a registered primary caregiver to qualifying patients, brought an action in the Kent Circuit Court against Byron Township, alleging that the township’s zoning ordinance which required that a primary caregiver obtain a permit before cultivating medical marijuana and that the caregiver cultivate the marijuana within a dwelling or garage in a residentially zoned area within the township as part of a regulated home occupation at a full-time residence directly conflicted with – and – was therefore preempted by the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (the MMMA), MCL 333.26421 et seq.
DeRuiter cultivated marijuana in an enclosed, locked facility at a commercially zoned property she rented in the township; she did not obtain a permit from the township before cultivating the medical marijuana as a primary caregiver.
At the township’s direction, DeRuiter’s landlord ordered her to stop cultivating medical marijuana at the property or face legal action.
When the township attempted to enforce its zoning ordinance, DeRuiter filed the instant action, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the ordinance’s legality; the township countersued, seeking a declaration that the ordinance did not conflict with the MMMA.
Both parties moved for summary disposition, and the court, Paul J. Sullivan, J., granted summary disposition in favor of DeRuiter, holding that the ordinance directly conflicted with the MMMA and that it was therefore preempted by the act.
The Court of Appeals, HOEKSTRA, P.J., and MURPHY and MARKEY, JJ., affirmed the trial court order, concluding that the MMMA preempted defendant’s home-occupation zoning ordinance because the ordinance directly conflicted with the MMMA by prohibiting what the MMMA permitted and because the ordinance improperly imposed regulations and penalties upon persons who engage in the MMMA-compliant medical use of marijuana. 325 Mich App 275 (2018).
Byron Township applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. 503 Mich 942 (2019).
In a unanimous opinion by Justice BERNSTEIN, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
Under the conflict-preemption doctrine, the MMMA DOES NOT nullify a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate land use under the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA), MCL 125.3101 et seq., as long as
(1) the municipality does not prohibit or penalize the cultivation of medical marijuana and (2) the municipality does not impose regulations that are unreasonable inconsistent with regulations established by state law.
MCL 333.26424(b)(2) states that primary caregivers and qualifying patients must keep their plants in an enclosed, locked facility in order for those individuals to be entitled to the MMMA protections in MCL 333.26424(a) and (b).
Because an enclosed, locked facility may be found in various locations on various types of property, the township’s ordinance limiting where medical marijuana must be cultivated within the locality did not directly conflict with the MMMA’s requirement that marijuana plants be kept in an enclosed, locked facility.
The township’s ordinance requiring primary caregivers to obtain a permit and pay a fee before using a building or structure within the township to cultivate medical marijuana also did not directly conflict with the MMMA because the ordinance did not effectively prohibit the medical use of marijuana.
Generally, local governments may control and regulate matters of local concern when that power is conferred by the state.
However, state law may preempt a local regulation either expressly or by implication. Implied preemption can occur when the state has occupied the entire field of regulation in a certain area (field preemption) or when a local regulation directly conflicts with state law (conflict preemption).
A direct conflict exists when the ordinance permits what the statute prohibits or the ordinance prohibits what the statute permits; there is no conflict between state and local law when a locality enacts regulations that are not unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state law so long as the state regulatory scheme does not occupy the field.
That is, while a local ordinance is preempted when it bans an activity that is authorized and regulated by state law, a local governmental unit may add to the conditions in a statute as long as the additional requirements do not contradict the requirements set forth in the statute.
A court must review both the statute and the local ordinance to determine whether conflict preemption applies.
MCL 333.26424(a) and (b) provide that qualifying patients and primary caregivers are immune from arrest, prosecution, or penalty in any manner, including, but not limited to, civil penalty or disciplinary action for the medical use of marijuana in accordance with the MMMA.
In turn, MCL 333.26424(b)(2) provides that primary caregivers and qualifying patients must keep their plants in an enclosed, locked facility in order to qualify for the immunity.
This requirement sets forth the type of structure marijuana plants must be kept and grown in for a patient or a caregiver to be entitled to the MMMA protections in MCL 333.26424(a) and (b), but the provision does not address where marijuana may be grown.
Under Ter Beek v City of Wyoming, 495 Mich 1 (2014), a local ordinance conflicts with the MMMA when the ordinance results in a complete prohibition of the medical use of marijuana; however, The MMMA does not foreclose all local regulation of marijuana.
In that regard, the act does not nullify a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate land use under the MZEA as long as (1) the municipality does not prohibit or penalize the cultivation of medical marijuana and (2) the municipality does not impose regulations that are unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state law.
Because an enclosed, locked facility may be found in various locations on various types of property, a local regulation limiting where medical marijuana must be cultivated within a locality does not conflict with the statutory requirement that marijuana plants be kept in an enclosed, locked facility.
In this case, the township’s ordinance allowed for the medical use of marijuana by a registered primary caregiver but placed limitations on where the caregiver could cultivate marijuana within the township.
The ordinance’s geographical restriction added to and complemented the limitations imposed by the MMMA; it did not directly conflict with the MMMA.
While the ordinance went further in its regulation than the MMMA, the township appropriately used its authority under the MZEA to craft an ordinance that did not directly conflict with the MMMA’s provision requiring that marijuana be cultivated in an enclosed, locked facility. The township also had authority under the MZEA to require zoning permits and permit fees for the use of buildings and structures within its jurisdiction.
The township’s ordinance requiring primary caregivers to obtain a permit and pay a fee before using a building or structure within the township to cultivate medical marijuana did not directly conflict with the MMMA because the ordinance did not effectively prohibit the medical use of marijuana, and DeRuiter did not argue that the requirements for obtaining a permit were so unreasonable as to create a conflict.
To the extent that DeRuiter argued that the immunity provisions of the MMMA contributed to a blanket prohibition on local governments regulating the medical use of marijuana with respect to time, place, and manner of such use, that argument sounded in field preemption; but neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals reached the issue of field preemption, and DeRuiter conceded that her appeal did not concern the issue of field preemption.
The Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of DeRuiter.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
If you are medical marijuana patient or caregiver facing any type of legal action contact attorney Michael Komorn. The Komorn Law firm has a long history of fighting for the rights of medical marijuana patients and caregivers.
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WASHINGTON — Siding with a small-time drug offender in Indiana whose $42,000 Land Rover was seized by law enforcement officials, the Supreme Court on Wednesday ruled that the Constitution places limits on civil forfeiture laws that allow states and localities to take and keep private property used to commit crimes.
Civil forfeiture is a popular way to raise revenue, and its use has been the subject of widespread criticism across the political spectrum.
The SCOTUS has ruled that the Eighth Amendment, which bars “excessive fines,” limits the ability of the federal government to seize property. On Wednesday, the court ruled that the clause also applies to the states.
Previously, the Supreme Court had not really addressed that question. It had addressed the status of the Excessive Fines Clause, but only in the context of the federal government.
The court had, however, previously ruled that most protections under the Bill of Rights apply to the states — or were incorporated against them, in the legal jargon — under the 14th Amendment.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for eight justices, said the question was an easy one. “The historical and logical case for concluding that the 14th Amendment incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause is overwhelming,” she wrote.
“For good reason, the protection against excessive fines has been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history: Exorbitant tolls undermine other constitutional liberties,” she wrote. “Excessive fines can be used, for example, to retaliate against or chill the speech of political enemies.”
