What does Nolle Prosequi mean?

Fatal Flaw

In criminal cases, nolle prosequi may be employed when there is a significant weakness in the prosecution’s case, when the prosecutor acknowledges an inability to prove the charges, or even when the prosecutor has lost confidence in the defendant’s guilt.

Dropped

Nolle prosequi is a formal statement issued by a prosecutor in a criminal proceeding or by a plaintiff in a civil case indicating that the prosecution or plaintiff has decided to discontinue the case against the defendant.

In criminal cases, nolle prosequi can be invoked when there is a significant flaw in the prosecution’s case, when the prosecutor acknowledges an inability to prove the charges, or when the prosecutor comes to doubt the defendant’s guilt.

Nolle Prosequi and Double Jeopardy

Nolle prosequi is a formal decision to terminate a civil or criminal case through voluntary dismissal. In the context of a criminal case, this action effectively removes the charges without prejudice, meaning the prosecutor retains the right to re-file the same charges in the future. Since this type of discontinuation does not result in a judgment or verdict regarding the merits of the case, double jeopardy does not apply; the defendant has not been tried for the charges that were dropped.

There are various reasons a prosecutor might choose to file a motion for nolle prosequi. In some jurisdictions, the prosecutor has the authority to dismiss criminal charges independently, while in others, a formal motion for nolle prosequi must be presented to the court for approval. Among the prevalent reasons for seeking a nolle prosequi are considerations such as insufficient evidence, witness unavailability, or new developments in the case.

When you get a Motion for Nollie Pros – You know you hired the right Attorney

We got 3 today (March 4, 2026)

Komorn Law, founded in 1993, brings decades of seasoned experience to Michigan’s most complex criminal and regulatory matters, including the evolving cannabis framework from the MMMA to today’s MRTMA landscape. The firm represents clients facing controlled‑substance offenses, DUI and drug‑related driving charges, firearm violations, property crimes, resisting or obstructing, and the most serious allegations such as manslaughter and homicide. With a proven record in courts across Michigan and the federal system, Komorn Law delivers strategic, relentless advocacy when the stakes are highest. To work with a firm that truly refuses to back down, call  248-357-2550. 

Case Summary

The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the defendant’s conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct against his fourteen‑year‑old daughter. The Court held that although one evidentiary error occurred, it was harmless under Michigan’s statutory harmless‑error rule (MCL 769.26).

Background

• The complainant alleged that her father sexually assaulted her over forty times during a two‑year period, including the charged incident in May 1992.

• She disclosed the abuse in 1993 and later attempted suicide.

• The defendant’s son testified that the defendant apologized and made statements implying responsibility, including that the complainant “said to do these things” and that she “had eyes like her mother’s.”

• The defendant denied any sexual contact and claimed his apology related to non‑sexual conduct.

Issues on Appeal

The Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction based on the cumulative effect of three alleged errors:

1. Improper bolstering of the complainant’s character for truthfulness before her credibility was attacked.
2. Improper admission of evidence that the defendant smoked marijuana with his son.
3. Improper expert testimony that the complainant’s behavior was consistent with that of a sexual abuse victim.

The Supreme Court addressed each in turn.

Holdings

1. Bolstering the complainant’s truthfulness (Error, but harmless)

• The prosecution introduced testimony from several witnesses about the complainant’s good character for truthfulness before she testified and before the defense attacked her character for truthfulness.

• Under MRE 608(a), this was inadmissible because the defense’s opening statement questioned her credibility (memory, perception), not her character for truthfulness.

• However, the error was harmless because:

  • The defendant’s son provided powerful, untainted testimony about the defendant’s apology, which the Court viewed as a near‑confession.

  • Under MCL 769.26, the defendant failed to show it was more probable than not that the error affected the outcome.

This case is significant because the Court overruled the “highly probable” harmless‑error standard from People v. Gearns and adopted a “more probable than not” standard for preserved, nonconstitutional errors.

2. Evidence of smoking marijuana with his son (No error)

• The defendant testified on direct examination that he was a good father who engaged only in appropriate activities with his children.
• This opened the door under MRE 404(a)(1) to rebuttal character evidence.
• Under MRE 405(a), the prosecutor could cross‑examine him about specific instances—including smoking marijuana with his son—to challenge that claimed character trait.
• The Court held this was proper rebuttal, not impermissible “other‑acts” evidence under MRE 404(b).

3. Expert testimony on behavior consistent with sexual abuse victims (No error)

• The defense argued the complainant had emotional problems affecting her ability to recall events.

• This raised the issue of her post‑incident behavior, including suicide attempts.

• Under People v. Peterson, once the defense raises such issues, an expert may testify that the complainant’s behavior is consistent with that of a sexual abuse victim.

• The expert did not vouch for the complainant’s truthfulness or say abuse occurred—so the testimony was permissible.

In Closing

• Court of Appeals reversed.

• Conviction reinstated.

The Court held that only one error occurred, and it was not outcome‑determinative under Michigan’s statutory harmless‑error rule.

Here are some related links and articles

• People v. Lukity (1999) 
• People v. Gearns (1992) – harmless‑error standard later rejected in Lukity
• People v. Mateo (2002) – further discusses harmless‑error analysis 
• People v. Peterson (1989) – governs expert testimony on child sexual‑abuse accommodation syndrome 
• People v. Starr (2000) – clarifies use of character evidence under MRE 404 

• MCL 769.26 — Harmless‑error statute 

• MCL 750.520b — First‑degree criminal sexual conduct 

• Michigan Rules of Evidence (MRE 404, 405, 608) 

Komorn Law, founded in 1993, brings decades of seasoned experience to Michigan’s most complex criminal and regulatory matters, including the evolving cannabis framework from the MMMA to today’s MRTMA landscape. The firm represents clients facing controlled‑substance offenses, DUI and drug‑related driving charges, firearm violations, property crimes, resisting or obstructing, and the most serious allegations such as manslaughter and homicide. With a proven record in courts across Michigan and the federal system, Komorn Law delivers strategic, relentless advocacy when the stakes are highest. To work with a firm that truly refuses to back down, call  248-357-2550. 

Case Summary

In People v Kvasnicka, the defendant sent a message to a young girl stating she “would not be laughing” when he came to her school to “shoot it up or blow it up like Columbine.” Charged under Michigan’s threat‑of‑terrorism statute, he argued the law was unconstitutional because it lacked a required subjective mental‑state element.

The Court of Appeals initially agreed, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Counterman v Colorado, which held that true‑threat statutes must require proof that the speaker had a subjective understanding of the threatening nature of their statements.

The Michigan Supreme Court later vacated that decision and remanded the case. On remand, the Court of Appeals upheld the statute by applying the constitutional‑doubt canon and interpreting the law to include a recklessness requirement.

Background

Michigan’s threat‑of‑terrorism statute criminalizes communicating threats of violence intended to intimidate or coerce. After Counterman, courts nationwide have been reevaluating threat statutes to ensure they include a constitutionally required mental state. Without such a requirement, statutes risk criminalizing protected speech or chilling lawful expression.

The key question in Kvasnicka was whether Michigan’s statute implicitly contained a mens rea requirement even though the text did not expressly state one.

Lower and Higher Court Opinions

Initial Court of Appeals Decision:

• Held the statute unconstitutional because it lacked a subjective mental‑state requirement.

• Found that Counterman required proof that the defendant understood the threatening nature of his statements.

Michigan Supreme Court:

• Vacated the Court of Appeals decision.

• Remanded for reconsideration under the constitutional‑doubt canon.

Court of Appeals on Remand:

• Applied the constitutional‑doubt canon, which requires courts to adopt any reasonable interpretation that avoids constitutional problems.

• Concluded that because the statute does not specify a mens rea, courts may instruct juries that the defendant must have consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communication would be viewed as threatening violence.

• Reversed its earlier ruling and upheld the statute’s constitutionality.

What’s at Stake

This case sits at the intersection of free speech and public safety. The stakes include:

• Protecting constitutional speech by ensuring threat statutes require a subjective mental state.

• Preserving public‑safety tools that allow prosecutors to address genuine threats of violence.

• Clarifying statutory interpretation when legislative silence creates constitutional ambiguity.

The decision ensures Michigan’s threat‑of‑terrorism statute remains enforceable while aligning with modern First Amendment requirements.

In Closing

The Michigan Supreme Court has overturned the Court of Appeals’ ruling that deemed the state’s terroristic threats statute facially invalid and has sent the case back for further evaluation of whether the complete invalidation of the statute can be prevented by interpreting the mens rea requirement.

People v Kvasnicka ultimately reaffirms the constitutionality of Michigan’s threat‑of‑terrorism statute by reading a recklessness standard into the law. The case illustrates how courts balance constitutional protections with the need to address serious threats, and it provides a clear interpretive framework for future true‑threat prosecutions.

Here are some related links and articles

• MCL 750.543m — Threat of terrorism
• People v Kvasnicka, No 371542
• SADO – Article – Michigan Supreme Court vacates and remands in Kvasnicka
• Counterman v Colorado, 600 US 66 (2023) — True‑threat mens rea requirement
• People-v-Jones-860-NW2d-112-497-Mich-155-Mich-2014 — Constitutional‑doubt canon

Komorn Law, founded in 1993, brings decades of seasoned experience to Michigan’s most complex criminal and regulatory matters, including the evolving cannabis framework from the MMMA to today’s MRTMA landscape. The firm represents clients facing controlled‑substance offenses, DUI and drug‑related driving charges, firearm violations, property crimes, resisting or obstructing, and the most serious allegations such as manslaughter and homicide. With a proven record in courts across Michigan and the federal system, Komorn Law delivers strategic, relentless advocacy when the stakes are highest. To work with a firm that truly refuses to back down, call  248-357-2550. 

Prisoner in Possession of a Controlled Substance

Case Summary

In People v Tadgerson, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed a critical question: does the crime of a prisoner possessing a controlled substance under MCL 800.281(4) require proof of intent, or is it a strict‑liability offense? The case arose after a guard observed another inmate drop something into the defendant’s cell door slot. Moments later, the defendant was seen holding a crumpled piece of paper that contained a controlled substance. The Court ultimately held that the offense is not strict liability and that the prosecution must prove at least recklessness.

Background

Michigan law criminalizes possession of controlled substances by inmates to maintain order and safety within correctional facilities. Historically, some prison‑related offenses have been treated as strict liability due to the heightened security concerns inherent in custodial environments.

However, modern criminal‑law principles generally require a culpable mental state unless the Legislature clearly indicates otherwise. The question in Tadgerson was whether the statute’s silence on intent meant that no mental state was required, or whether courts should infer one.

Lower and Higher Court Opinions

Lower courts were divided on whether MCL 800.281(4) imposed strict liability. Some treated the statute as requiring no proof of intent, while others inferred a mental‑state requirement.

The Michigan Supreme Court resolved the issue by holding:

• The statute does not expressly impose strict liability.

• When a statute is silent on mens rea, courts must determine whether a mental state is necessary to avoid criminalizing innocent conduct.

• At minimum, the prosecution must prove recklessness, meaning the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he possessed a controlled substance.

This ruling aligns the statute with broader constitutional and due‑process principles.

What’s at Stake

The decision has significant implications:

• For inmates, it prevents conviction based solely on proximity or accidental possession.

• For prosecutors, it clarifies the burden of proof and requires evidence of a culpable mental state.

• For correctional facilities, it balances institutional security with constitutional protections.

By requiring recklessness, the Court ensures that criminal liability attaches only when the defendant’s conduct demonstrates awareness of the risk and disregard for it.

In Closing

People v Tadgerson establishes that prisoners cannot be convicted of possessing controlled substances without proof of at least reckless conduct. The ruling reinforces the principle that criminal statutes—even in the prison context—must include a meaningful mental‑state requirement unless the Legislature clearly states otherwise.

Here are some related links and articles

• MSC 165678 PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER LEHMAN TADGERSON Opinion on Application – Remand to TC 7/21/2025
• MCL – Section 800.281 – Michigan Legislature

• Morissette v United States, 342 US 246 (1952) — Mens rea requirement

• People v Quinn, 440 Mich 178 (1992) — Interpreting silent‑mens‑rea statutes

Komorn Law, founded in 1993, brings decades of seasoned experience to Michigan’s most complex criminal and regulatory matters, including the evolving cannabis framework from the MMMA to today’s MRTMA landscape. The firm represents clients facing controlled‑substance offenses, DUI and drug‑related driving charges, firearm violations, property crimes, resisting or obstructing, and the most serious allegations such as manslaughter and homicide. With a proven record in courts across Michigan and the federal system, Komorn Law delivers strategic, relentless advocacy when the stakes are highest. To work with a firm that truly refuses to back down, call  248-357-2550. 

Case Summary

In People v Jones, the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed whether a single act of abuse can support convictions for both first‑degree child abuse and felony murder. The defendant argued that using the same conduct to support both charges violated constitutional and statutory principles. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that when the defendant acts with the required intent for each offense, one act may legally sustain both convictions.

Background

Michigan’s felony‑murder rule allows a homicide to be elevated to first‑degree murder if it occurs during the commission of certain underlying felonies. One of those felonies is first‑degree child abuse. Prosecutors often charge both offenses when a child dies during an abusive act, but defendants frequently challenge whether the same conduct can serve as the basis for both crimes.

The issue in Jones centered on whether the defendant’s single act of abuse could simultaneously satisfy the intent requirements for child abuse and felony murder.

Lower and Higher Court Opinions

The trial court allowed both charges to proceed, finding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of intent for each offense.

On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held:

• First‑degree child abuse requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally caused serious physical harm to a child.

• Felony murder requires proof that the defendant caused a death during the commission of a statutorily listed felony, including first‑degree child abuse.

• If the defendant acted with the necessary intent for child abuse, and the abuse caused the child’s death, the same act may support both convictions.

The court emphasized that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy does not prevent multiple convictions arising from a single act when the Legislature clearly intended separate punishments.

What’s at Stake

This decision reinforces the prosecution’s ability to charge and convict defendants of both first‑degree child abuse and felony murder based on the same conduct. The stakes are significant:

• For defendants, it means exposure to multiple serious convictions and mandatory life imprisonment.

• For prosecutors, it clarifies that they may pursue both charges without needing separate acts of abuse.

• For courts, it provides guidance on interpreting legislative intent in overlapping‑offense scenarios.

The ruling strengthens Michigan’s approach to protecting children by ensuring that severe abuse resulting in death can be punished to the fullest extent permitted by law.

In Closing

People v Jones confirms that a single abusive act can support convictions for both first‑degree child abuse and felony murder when the defendant acts with the required intent. The decision underscores Michigan’s strong stance on child‑protection offenses and clarifies the relationship between overlapping criminal statutes.

Here are some related links and articles

• MCL 750.316(1)(b) — Felony murder
• MCL 750.136b(2) — First‑degree child abuse
• People v Jones, No 362854
• People v Ream, 481 Mich 223 (2008) — Double‑jeopardy analysis
• People v Smith, 478 Mich 292 (2007) — Legislative‑intent framework

Komorn Law, founded in 1993, brings decades of seasoned experience to Michigan’s most complex criminal and regulatory matters, including the evolving cannabis framework from the MMMA to today’s MRTMA landscape. The firm represents clients facing controlled‑substance offenses, DUI and drug‑related driving charges, firearm violations, property crimes, resisting or obstructing, and the most serious allegations such as manslaughter and homicide. With a proven record in courts across Michigan and the federal system, Komorn Law delivers strategic, relentless advocacy when the stakes are highest. To work with a firm that truly refuses to back down, call  248-357-2550.