Walking is cool... For fun and excercise. Not because you lost your license. Don't do the crime if you can't pay the price. But if you do get charged with a crime. Better Call Komorn to fight for your rights.
Drinking alcohol or smoking marijuana and driving in Michigan is extremely dangerous and illegal due to the significant impairment these substances cause to a driver's ability to operate a vehicle safely. Here's why:
Impaired Judgment: Both alcohol and marijuana affect judgment, leading to poor decision-making behind the wheel, such as misjudging distances, speed, and traffic situations.
Reduced Reaction Time: These substances slow down a driver's reaction time, making it difficult to respond quickly to unexpected hazards, pedestrians, or changes in traffic flow.
Decreased Motor Skills and Coordination: Alcohol and marijuana impair motor skills and coordination, affecting steering, braking, lane keeping, and overall vehicle control.
Altered Perception: Marijuana can distort time and distance perception, making it challenging to judge safe following distances and the speed of other vehicles. Alcohol also affects vision and spatial awareness.
Increased Risk of Accidents: The combination of these impairments significantly increases the risk of being involved in a traffic accident, potentially leading to serious injuries or fatalities for the driver, passengers, and other road users.
Legal Consequences: Driving under the influence of alcohol or marijuana in Michigan carries severe legal penalties, including fines, license suspension, jail time, and a criminal record.
FAQ 1: What is the legal blood alcohol content (BAC) limit for driving in Michigan, and what are the legal limits for marijuana?
In Michigan, the legal BAC limit for drivers 21 years or older is 0.08%. For drivers under 21, there is a "zero tolerance" law, meaning any measurable amount of alcohol can lead to a violation.
For marijuana, Michigan law prohibits driving with any amount of detectable THC (the psychoactive component of marijuana) in your system while operating a vehicle. Unlike alcohol, there isn't a specific numerical threshold for THC. If law enforcement detects any amount of THC in your blood, you can be charged with Operating While Impaired by Marijuana (OWIM).
FAQ 2: What are the potential penalties if I am caught driving under the influence of alcohol or marijuana in Michigan?
The penalties for driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol or marijuana in Michigan vary depending on the number of prior offenses and the specific circumstances of the case. Potential penalties for a first offense include:
Fines: Up to $500 for OWI (alcohol) and up to $500 for OWIM (marijuana).
Jail Time: Up to 93 days.
License Suspension: Up to 180 days (with a restricted license possible after 30 days).
Driver Responsibility Fees: $125.
Community Service: Possible.
Substance Abuse Evaluation and Treatment: Required.
Penalties increase significantly for second and subsequent offenses, including longer jail sentences, higher fines, longer license revocations, vehicle immobilization, and potential felony charges.
FAQ 3: Can I refuse a breathalyzer or blood test if I am suspected of DUI in Michigan?
Under Michigan's implied consent law (MCL 257.625a), by operating a vehicle on public roads, you are deemed to have given your consent to submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT) at a traffic stop if lawfully detained for suspicion of drunk driving. Refusal to take a PBT can result in a civil infraction and fines.
For evidentiary breath or blood tests at a police station or hospital, refusal can lead to an automatic one-year suspension of your driver's license (two years for a second refusal within seven years), even if you are not ultimately convicted of DUI. There are limited exceptions to this, such as a valid medical reason.
FAQ 4: What are some common roadside sobriety tests used by Michigan law enforcement, and are they mandatory?
Michigan law enforcement officers often use Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) during traffic stops where DUI is suspected. These typically include:
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN): Following a moving object with your eyes to check for involuntary jerking.
Walk and Turn: Walking heel-to-toe along a line, turning, and walking back.
One-Leg Stand: Standing on one leg while counting.
While officers may request you to perform these tests, you are generally not legally required to take them under Michigan law. Refusal to take SFSTs does not carry the same license suspension penalties as refusing an evidentiary breath or blood test. However, officers can still use your refusal and their observations of your demeanor and driving to establish probable cause for an arrest and a subsequent request for an evidentiary test.
FAQ 5: What are some legal defenses against DUI charges involving alcohol or marijuana in Michigan, and how is Komorn Law experienced in fighting these types of charges?
There are several potential legal defenses that an experienced attorney can explore when fighting DUI charges involving alcohol or marijuana in Michigan. These defenses often focus on challenging the legality of the stop, the procedures used during the investigation, and the accuracy of the evidence presented:
Illegal Stop: Arguing that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop in the first place.
Improper Administration of Field Sobriety Tests: Challenging whether the SFSTs were administered correctly according to standardized procedures, which can affect their reliability as evidence of impairment.
Challenges to Breathalyzer or Blood Test Procedures: Questioning the calibration and maintenance of breathalyzer machines or the chain of custody and testing procedures for blood samples. This can involve scrutinizing logbooks, certifications, and the qualifications of the technicians.
Medical or Physical Conditions: Presenting evidence that a medical condition or physical limitation (unrelated to impairment) could have affected performance on field sobriety tests or the accuracy of breathalyzer results (e.g., GERD).
Rising Blood Alcohol Defense: In alcohol cases, arguing that your BAC was below the legal limit while driving but rose above it by the time the breath or blood test was administered.
Lack of Probable Cause for Arrest: Asserting that the officer did not have sufficient probable cause to make the arrest for DUI, even if a test was eventually administered.
Challenges to Marijuana Testing: Arguing that the presence of THC in blood doesn't necessarily equate to current impairment, as THC can remain in the system for days or even weeks after use. Attorneys may challenge the lack of a specific legal impairment threshold for marijuana and the correlation between THC levels and actual impairment.
Facing charges for driving under the influence of marijuana or alcohol in Michigan?
Komorn Law has extensive experience in defending individuals charged with DUI offenses involving both alcohol and marijuana in Michigan. Their attorneys are knowledgeable about the nuances of Michigan DUI laws, the scientific principles behind breath and blood testing, and the proper administration of field sobriety tests. They are skilled at:
Thoroughly investigating the circumstances of the arrest, including reviewing police reports, dashcam footage, and bodycam footage.
Identifying potential violations of your constitutional rights during the traffic stop and subsequent investigation.
Challenging the admissibility of evidence based on procedural errors or scientific inaccuracies.
Working with expert witnesses, such as toxicologists and medical professionals, to challenge the prosecution's evidence.
Developing and presenting compelling legal defenses tailored to the specific facts of your case.
Negotiating with prosecutors for reduced charges or alternative resolutions when appropriate.
Aggressively representing clients at trial when a favorable outcome cannot be reached through negotiation.
If you are facing DUI charges in Michigan involving alcohol or marijuana, the experienced legal team at Komorn Law can provide you with a strong defense and fight to protect your rights and your future.
We fight for our clients throughout the State of Michigan and Northern Ohio.
Here are some court contacts we frequently handle cases.
Oakland County
If you are facing any legal charges in Oakland County and need to hire an attorney, call our Office (248) 357-2550. If you need to contact the court, here is the information:
Telephone Number: (248) 858-0344
Address: 1200 N Telegraph Rd, Department 404, Pontiac, MI 48341-0404
If you are facing any legal charges in Macomb County and need to hire an attorney, call our Office (248) 357-2550. If you need to contact the court, here is the information:
If you are facing any legal charges in Wayne County and need to hire an attorney, call our Office (248) 357-2550. If you need to contact the court, here is the information for the Third Circuit Court (Wayne County):
Telephone Number (Civil/Family): (313) 224-5510
Telephone Number (Criminal): (313) 224-5261 or (313) 224-2503
Address (Civil/Family): 2 Woodward Avenue, Detroit, MI 48226
Address (Criminal): 1441 St. Antoine, Detroit, MI 48226
If you are facing any legal charges in Kent County and need to hire an attorney, call our Office (248) 357-2550. If you need to contact the court, here is the information:
Telephone Number: (616) 632-5220
Address: 180 Ottawa Avenue NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49503
If you are facing any legal charges in Traverse County and need to hire an attorney, call our Office (248) 357-2550. If you need to contact the court, here is the information for the 13th Circuit Court (which includes Traverse County):
Telephone Number: (231) 922-4701
Address: 328 Washington Street, Suite 300, Traverse City, MI 49684
If you are facing any legal charges in Monroe County and need to hire an attorney, call our Office (248) 357-2550. If you need to contact the court, here is the information:
*This section is based in large part on a paper prepared for the Commission by Jane Lang McGrew, an attorney from Washington, D.C.
In 1920, the national policy of Prohibition began. The 18th Amendment to the Constitution had been officially ratified:
It sought, by law, to make the whole Nation into enforced teetotalers and to put an end to all evils associated with drinking. It sought to eradicate a taste deeply rooted in the habits and customs of a large part of the population through outlawing the business that ministered to its satisfaction (Hu, 1950: 48).
1650-1750: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
In fact, it started earlier. "Ministers shall not give themselves to excess in drinkinge, or riott, or spending their tyme idellye day or night," ruled the Virginia Colonial Assembly in 1629 (Cherrington, 1920:16).
Massachusetts ordered that no person shall remain in any tavern "longer than necessary occasions" in 1637, while Plymouth Colony in 1633 prohibited the sale of spirits "more than 2 pence worth to anyone but strangers just arrived" (Cherrington, 1920: 18).
This sampling of the earliest colonial laws is representative of the attempt, continued since those times, to control excessive consumption. Excessive drinking, it was considered, produced behavior unseemly in some, such as ministers, and dangerous in others, such as Indians.
But drinking per se was not frowned upon. Indeed, when the Puritans set sail to Massachusetts, they had taken care to carry with them 42 tons of beer (in contrast with 14 tons of water) and 10,000 gallons of wine (Lee, 1963: 15).
The regulation of liquor consumption was a matter of considerable concern in certain colonies. Thus, for a time, Massachusetts went so far as to prohibit the drinking of healths in 1638 (Lee, 1963: 19). The law was soon abandoned for reasons obvious, albeit unrecorded. It rapidly became clear, however, that liquor laws could do more and perhaps better, than control consumption: they could provide a source of revenue. By the turn of the 18th century, the regulatory impulse was concentrated on fines, excise taxes and license fees.
Fines were imposed for drunken behavior, unlawful sales to a drunken tippler or to Indians, and for selling without a license. Court records indicate that these laws were enforced with reasonable regularity (Krout 1967: 29-30). Licenses often carried their own fees, and excise taxes were levied upon distilled spirits as well as beer and fermented drink in many cases.
Until the 18th century, however, there was no attempt to prohibit the manufacture, importation, sale, or consumption of alcoholic beverages. Quite the contrary, at least one individual-in some cases a reluctant individual-was required in many towns to run the local inn or public house for visitors and travelers.
Although colonial statutes made it clear that tipplers and idlers were unwelcome, the diary of a colonial traveler, Sarah Kemble Knight, suggests that such laws were unsuccessful in containing the ribaldry which took place in many such houses. Madam Knight complained:
I could get no sleep, because of the Clamor of some of the Town Tope-ers in the next room.... I heartily fretted & wish't 'am tongue tyed.... They kept calling for Tother Gill, Wch while they were swallowing, was some Intermission, But presently, like Oyle to fire, encreased the flame (Miller, Johnson, eds., 1963: 430-431).
Persons other than Madam Knight were to become more outspoken about their concern for the use of spirits. The, most significant premonition was the Colony of Georgia's action in 1735 when the first prohibitory statute against the importation of "ardent spirits" was enacted. At the same time, however, the consumption of beer was encouraged (Grant, 1932: 1). The time for temperance had not yet arrived.
1750-1825: TEMPERANCE STIRRINGS
As the evils of intemperance began to attract the attention of the ministry, John Wesley denounced the sin of distilling -and declared for its Prohibition in 1773 (Cherrington, 1920: 37-38).
On his heels came the publication of a pamphlet entitled "The Mighty Destroyer Displayed and Some Account of the Dreadful Havoc Made by the Mistaken Use, As Well As the Abuse, of Distilled Spiritous Liquors," by Anthony Benezet, a member of the Society of Friends, advising against the use of any drink "which is liable to steal away a man's senses and render him foolish, irrascible, uncontrollable, and dangerous" (Cherrington, 1920: 38).
Nevertheless, typical of the century's ambivalence, the first master at Harvard was fired when it was found that Harvard students had been left "wanting beer betwixt brewings a week and a week and a half together" (Lee, 1963: 16).
Concern for the effect of liquor upon the public weal was expressed by John Adams who noted in his diary on February 29, 1760, that the taverns were "becoming the eternal haunt of loose, disorderly people . . ." (Cherrington, 1920: 37). Worst of all he continued:
... These houses are become the nurseries of our legislators. An artful man, who has neither sense nor sentiments, may, by gaining a little sway among the rabble of the town, multiply taverns and dram shops and thereby secure the votes of taverner and retailer and of all; and the multiplication of taverns will make many, who may be induced to flip and rum, to vote for any man whatever (Dobyns, 1940: 215).
The health argument in behalf of temperance was first made by Nathaniel Ames, in the 1752 edition of his Almanack, who wrote that
Strong Waters were formerly used only by the Direction of Physicians; but now Mechanicks and low-li'd Labourers drink Rum like Fountain-Water, and they can infinitely better endure it than the idle. unactive and sedentary Part of Mankind, but DEATH is in the bottom of the cup of every one (Lee, 1963: 22).
Dr. Benjamin Rush shared his concern, publishing in 1785 his now famous "Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent Spirits Upon the Human Body and Mind." Enumerating the diseases of the body and mind which plague the drinker of distilled liquors, Dr. Rush outlined the symptoms, including "unusual garrulity, unusual silence, captiousness ... an insipid simpering ... profane swearing ... certain immodest actions" and "certain extravagant acts which indicate a temporary fit of madness" (Rush, 1943: 323, 325-326).
Although the rumblings of the temperance movement were thus perceptible in the late 18th century, there is no evidence that its effects were felt. In 1766, it is recorded that the repeal of the Stamp Act was greeted in Providence, Rhode Island with "32 of the most loyal, patriotic and constitutional toasts" (Lee, 1963: 18). Notwithstanding this evidence of devotion to His Majesty. it was often thereafter the tavern which provided the meeting places for the most defiant revolutionaries.
Subsequently, when the colonial period disappeared into the post-Revolutionary era, Alexander Hamilton adopted the idea earlier effected by the individual colonies, to tax distilled liquors for revenue purposes. In 1791 , the tax was enacted as part of the Revenue Act. The following year, the Second Congress of the United States added license fees for distilleries and taxes on liquors distilled from imported materials.
Incensed by this federal action, farmers in Western Pennsylvania mobbed revenue collectors and armed to resist this intrusion by the new Federal Government. It required 15,000 militia to bring the so-called Whiskey Rebellion to an end (Peterson, 1969: 119-120). Such was the first indication that the liquor industry in the United States would be a force with which the government would have to reckon.
Toward the end of the 18th century, a temperance movement, as such, became discernible. The Methodist Church took a staunch position against the sale or imbibing of ardent spirits "unless in cases of extreme necessity." Five years later, in 1789, even the exception was excised (Cherrington, 1920: 50). A similar platform was adopted by the Presbyterian Synod of Pennsylvania and by the Yearly Meeting of Friends of New England (Cherrington, 1920: 51, 58).
On a non-clerical level, the movement began to organize. Although there is some dispute as to the identity of the original temperance society, it appears that as early as 1778, there was an organization calling itself the Free African Society which excluded men of drinking habits, followed soon thereafter by the Organization of Brethren, and the Litchfield, Connecticut Association of "the most respectable farmers" in Connecticut determined to discourage the use of spirits (Cherrington, 1920: 49, 58).
The turn of the century saw the vitalization of the temperance spirit. Religious leaders, including Cotton Mather, Dr. Lyman Beecher, John Wesley and Reverend Andrew Elliott inveighed against the consumption of liquors. Temperance activity figured prominently in the concerns of the Presbyterian, Methodist, Universalist, Baptist, and Friends churches.
"Had. the temperance reform in America awaited for a non-church or a non-Christian leadership," theorizes one historian,
... the temperance revolution of the past century would yet remain to be accomplished.... Every successful temperance movement of the last century has been merely the instrument-the machinery and equipment through which the fundamental principles of the Christian religion have expressed themselves in terms of life and action (Cherrington, 1920:92).
Whatever the Christian input , however, it is also apparent that a desire to reform was aroused in the country, very much like that which was to be experienced a century later during the Progressive Movement. Thus, Massachusetts Society for the Suppression of Intemperance of 1813, damned not only rum, but all of the "kindred vices, profaneness and gambling" and beseeched members to "discourage... by ... example and influence, every kind of..... immorality" (Lee, 1963: 23). Mingling with the potential temperance leaders during this period were the future spokesmen of abolitionism, feminism, and utopianism.
In the meantime, the industry was able to report triumphantly that the federal taxes on distilling and importing spirits were repealed in 1802. From 1813 until 1817, the retailers' and distillers' licenses bore a federal tax, but beginning in 1818 the industry enjoyed a tax-free era which was to last until 1862. Thomas Jefferson rejoiced-"as a moralist"-explaining that:
It is an error to view a tax on that liquor as merely a tax on the rich. It is a prohibition of its use in the middling class of our citizens, and a condemnation of them to the poison of whisky, which is desolating their houses. No nation is drunken where wine is cheap; and none sober, where the only antidote is the bane of whisky (Peterson, 1969: 122-123).
Future prohibitionists would likewise castigate the government for drawing its revenues from the liquor industry and participating in the profits of evil thereby.
1825-1870: THE PLEDGE
Temperance was not always equated with teetotalism. Beer and usually wine were initially exempt from denunciation in both sermons and treatises. There developed in the mid-19th century, however, the conviction that all brews, be they "ardent spirits," beer, ale, or wine, were anathema.
The, new temper of the movement was epitomized by the travels of Father Theobald Matthew of Ireland who toured the United States from 1849 to 1851, administering the pledge of total abstinence to some 600,000 persons in 25 states. A White House dinner and a Senate reception stamped official approval upon his sojourns (Furnas, 1968: 80). Thus did temperance drift into a new phase, with its ardent spokesman, Congressman Gerrit Smith, crying that:
I would that no person were able to drink intoxicating liquors without immediately becoming a drunkard. For, who, then would . . . drink the poison that always kills, or jump into the fire that always burns? (Furnas, 1968: 15).
It was in this atmosphere that the first prohibition experiments were undertaken on a statewide basis. "Until the liquor traffic is abolished . . . all efforts at moral reform must languish," judged one of the earliest prohibitionists.
In "Grappling with the Monster," T. S. Arthur stated, "The CURSE is upon us, and there is but one CURE: Total Abstinence, by the help of God, for the Individual, and Prohibition for the State" (Furnas, 1968: 15).
In 1847, the first such cure was enacted for the state of Maine (Cherrington, 1920: 134). (Actually, the first Prohibition law went into effect in 1843 in the territory of Oregon. This was repealed five years later.)
A wave of prohibition statutes followed. Delaware, on the heels of Maine, passed its first prohibition law only to have it declared unconstitutional the following year. Similar laws were enacted in Ohio, Illinois, Rhode Island, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and New York during the next few years. They met with varying fates, including veto by the governors, repeal by the legislatures and invalidation by the state supreme courts.
The evaluations by several historians of these early trials were to he heard again in the 20th century: the enactments lacked support from a large portion of the population, making enforcement exceedingly difficult. Ultimately, all but one of the states repealed the prohibition statutes of the 19th century (Grant, 1932: 5; Peterson, 1969: 123).
Notwithstanding this record, prohibitionists took heart. "This thing is of God," cried Lyman Beecher from the pulpit. "That glorious Maine law was a square and grand blow right between the horns of the Devil" (Furnas, 1968: 167). Temperance societies, established in all but three states by 1832 and destined to proliferate, began to consolidate as well.
The American Temperance Society, later to become the American Temperance Union, was organized in 1826. It quickly begat auxiliaries, so that by 1835, 8,000 locals existed (Cherrington, 1920: 92-93).
As the years passed, they witnessed the founding of more temperance, organizations of a general and national character than during any other period in the United States' history. The Washingtonian movement, organized in the City of Baltimore in 1840, was followed by the Martha Washington movement in 1841.
The Sons of Temperance came into existence in 1842, at, the same time the Order of Rechabites was organized, and the Congressional Temperance Society of 1833 was revived on the basis of total abstinence. They took heart at their early state, successes and fought against the defeats of repeal.
In the meantime, however, the United States government, which had heaped honors upon Father Matthew, concluded a treaty with King Kamehameha III of Hawaii in 1850 permitting the introduction and sale of liquor on his island.
As further evidence of the national dichotomy, Chicagoans in the 1850's fought virulently against the enforcement of Sunday closing laws. To protest, an armed mob burst into the business district of the city, to be met by police. Fortunately, the mob was dispersed before the mayor found it necessary to use the cannon he had hurriedly planted around City Hall (Peterson, 1969: 120).
It was the time when patent medicines, 40 proof and more, began to develop their clientele. And although the Demon Rum might threaten their health and life, Lydia Pinkham's Compound offered a cure for any and all ails and aches.
By the time of the Civil War, both the assimilative and coercive traditions of the temperance movement had crystallized: that is, temperance proponents were determined to save the weak and to destroy the recalcitrant (Gusfield, 1963: 69-70). The hardening of positions was accompanied by the development of political consciousness in the movement and recognition of political objectives. These processes were only temporarily blunted by the Civil War in the 1860's and the diversion of interest to the abolitionist cause.
Part of the heritage of the Civil War was the tax on liquor and beer imposed in 1862. Rates were increased several times between 1863 and 1868, so that the tax imposed at the rate of 20 cents per gallon rose to $2 per gallon.
An interesting phenomenon was noted by the Federal Government: as the rates increased, the revenue did not. In fact, the number of gallons reported actually declined. As the decade went on, attempts were made to enforce the tax laws and in 1868, $25,000 was actually appropriated to detect violators. Fraud continued almost unabated. Stockpiling of liquor was popular to hedge against future, increases, for they were not applicable to liquor on hand.
The infamous Whiskey Ring was active in these days and was not finally broken up until 1875, when, in a peak of nerve, members established a corruption fund in the District of Columbia to halt the prosecution of 321 persons charged with violations of the revenue laws. Before then, however, Congress apparently had second thoughts about the implications of the revenue collections and reduced the tax from the high of $2 per gallon to 50 cents in 1869. The happy result was to see a rise in collections from $13.5 million in 1868, to $45 million in 1869, and $55 million the following year. Taking further precautions, the government stipulated that new stamps be developed to preclude counterfeiting and tampering (History of the Alcohol 14-20; Cherrington, 1920: 156162).
Congress did not escape unscathed by criticism and reaction. It came from both sides of the temperance issue. Temperance advocates such as Senator Wilson of Massachusetts and Senator Pomeroy of Kansas decried the fact that federal revenues would be drawn from the liquor industry.
At the same, time, however, the industry revolted, leading to mass tax evasion schemes and devices and the organization of their first industry lobby, the United States Brewers Association. The Association rapidly launched a, legislative campaign and succeeded in 1863 in reducing the tax rate of beer from $1 to 60 cents (Cherrington, 1920:157).
By 1870, the Civil War dust had cleared and the temperance battle lines were drawn, already tested by the skirmishes of the 1840's and 1850's. The most interesting feature of their war strategy was soon to become apparent: women and children were welcomed at the battlements.
1870-1913: TOWARD A NATIONAL CONSCIENCE
A series of "isms" was aroused in this era: feminism, unionism, socialism, and progressivism. Prohibition absorbed elements of them all, and vice versa.
The feminist movement originated early in the 1800's. Until the 1870's, however, feminine involvement in the temperance effort was largely peripheral. The Women's Crusade of 1873 and the organization of the Women's Christian Temperance Union in 1874 marked the formal entrance of women into the temperance movement.
The WCTU was devotedly headed by Frances E. Willard, a lady equally committed to the principle of equality of the sexes. Temperance was to bridge the gap, she believed:
Drink and tobacco are the great separatists [sic] between men and women. Once they used these things together, but woman's evolution has carried her beyond them; man will climb to the same level . . . but meanwhile ... the fact that he permits himself fleshly indulgence that he would deprecate in her, makes their planes different, giving her an instinct of revulsion (Furnas, 1968: 281).
Although the WCTU was organized initially around the temperance issue, it was not long before Miss Willard's leadership expanded its conscience.
A statement of principles was adopted in its early years:
We believe in a living wage; in an 8-hour day; in courts of conciliation and arbitration, in justice as opposed to greed in gain; in "Peace on Earth and Good Will to Men" (Gusfield, 1963: 76).
Within three years of its inception, the WCTU reported that its concerns included "a better Indian policy" and "wiser civil service reform" (Gusfield, 1963: 77). There were those in the Union who felt that their interests should be limited to temperance. But, forecasting the mood of Progressivism, Miss Willard steered the organization along the broader lines to social reform.
The WCTU was responsible for part of the early campaign to educate the public about temperance. Children were recruited to sing praises of "the true and the brave" who signed the abstinence pledge. They were assisted in this effort by McGuffey's Readers which denounced the licensing of liquor stores and saloons:
Licensed-to do thy neighbor harm,
Licensed-to kindle hire and strife,
Licensed-to nerve the robber's arm,
Licensed-to whet the murderer's knife,
Licensed-like spider for a fly,
To spread thy nets for man, thy prey,
To mock his struggles, crush his soul,
Then cast his worthless form away (Lee, 1963: 34-35).
Whiskey makes "the happy miserable" and impoverishes the rich, the, McGuffey books concluded. And the word spread. By 1902, the temperance campaign had permeated the public school systems: every state but Arizona had introduced compulsory temperance education. Their texts teemed with both facts and misinformation such as "Alcohol sometimes causes the coats of the blood vessels to grow thin. They are then liable at any time to cause death by bursting." (Sinclair, 1962: 43).
The WCTU was not carrying the burden of reform alone, however. In 1869, the National Prohibition Party was born. Three years later, the first party ticket was put forth in the presidential campaign of 1872, headed by John Black, who received 5,607 votes for President. Success at the polls ultimately peaked in 1892 when John Dedwell, the Prohibition presidential candidate, received a total of 270,710 votes. Thereafter, its partisans declined in number, having failed to break voters away from their traditional affiliations (Cherrington, 1920: 165-169).
As a rule, the WCTU eschewed partisanship. Their objectives were far broader and more practical than those contemplated by the Prohibition Party. Only once it supported the Prohibition Party in the notorious election of 1884.
The election of 1884 carried a variety of implications for future candidates on the temperance issue. In New York City alone, 1,007 primaries and conventions reportedly were held by the various parties. Of these, over 60% took place in saloons (Peterson, 1969: 123), recalling to mind the complaint of John Adams a century before (Cherrington, 1920: 37; Dobyns, 1940: 215). The meeting places were indicative of the fact that at this time neither party could afford to adopt a dry plank in its platform, for New York would be a pivotal state in the race between Republican James G. Blaine and Democrat Grover Cleveland.
Blaine campaigned hard, trying to overcome the defection of several thousand dry Republicans to the Prohibition Party. Speaking in behalf of Blaine at a New York City rally, Presbyterian minister Samuel Burchard denounced the Democrats as the party of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion." Needless to say, the Catholic vote, as well as the wet vote, quickly swelled the Democratic totals. Blaine, having thus alienated both wets and drys, lost the state--and the election-by a tiny margin (Furnas, 1968: 273; Lee, 1963: 29-30).
In case the lesson that temperance was an issue to be reckoned with in national politics was lost on the parties after 1884, the events of the decade culminating in the birth of the Anti-Saloon League in 1895, dramatized the point. A second wave of state prohibition laws was experienced between 1880 and 1890. The results of much of the legislation during those years were less than satisfying to temperance advocates, however; only six states emerged with state-wide prohibition by statute or constitutional amendment. Numerous other states had enacted local option, which permitted towns to go dry if they so chose by referendum. Without state or federal insulation from wet communities, however, the so-called dry towns were scarcely temperance models.
In the wake of these state legislative actions, South Carolina introduced a state dispensary system in order to eliminate the motive of private gain from the liquor business. Political scandals which quickly developed tended to discredit it, however, if indeed it had enjoyed much support from any corner (Cherrington, 1920: 250-251).
With this discomfiting history behind it, the Anti-Saloon League arose to the challenge, while Carrie Nation independently thrust her way into the public eye. The League was to develop the art of lobbying or "pressure political" to its most dramatic heights. Scarcely more than 10 years after organization, it was described as "the most dangerous political movement that this country has ever known" by the National Model License League, a wet (and harassed) association. A more rational viewpoint was expressed by the president of the New York State Brewers Association in 1913:
We are not dealing with a theory which is the delusion of the fanatic alone, but with a real condition which is in the hands of a well organized force, led by aggressive, experienced, and untiring leaders (Odegard, 1928: 23).
The focus of the League's indictments included not simply alcohol, but the saloon itself, as the purveyor of spirits. The myriad League publications denounced the saloon for "annually sending thousands of our youths to destruction, for corrupting politics, dissipating workmen's wages, leading astray 60,000 girls each year into lives of immorality and banishing children from school" (Odegard, 1928: 40-59).
"Liquor is responsible for 19% of the divorces, 25% of the poverty, 25% of the insanity, 37% of the pauperism, 45% of child desertion, and 50% of the crime in this country," the League determined. "And this," it concluded , " is a very conservative estimate" (Odegard, 1928: 60).
League posters appeared everywhere depicting the saloon-keeper as a profiteer who feasted on death and enslavement. Others screamed out the dire consequences of alcohol. "Alcohol inflames the passions, thus making the temptation to sex-sin unusually strong," advertised one (Sinclair, 1962: 51).
It was the League which geared up the campaign, but it was not alone. As the Progressive spirit caught the national interest in the early 19th century, the movement for reform embraced the cause of temperance. The temperance movement assumed an aura of evangelism, combining the concept of America's mission with the vision of Messianism. Through the combination of temperance and progressivism, it was believed that the Kingdom of God could actually come to the United States.
In an article in Appleton's Magazine in 1908, the Reverend Charles F. Aked articulated the aspirations of the reformers:
We are spending our lives, many of us, in the effort to make the world a little better and brighter for those that shall come after us.... we want to open out life and liberty to all the sons of men. We want to make possible for all of life in the whole, the good and the beautiful ... and the common sale of intoxicating liquor renders our work a thousand times more difficult ... (Timberlake, 1063: 34-38).
Others were more mundane. Scientists began accumulating evidence of the effect of quantities of alcohol on the nervous system and general physical condition. The myth that alcohol consumption improved muscular power was exploded. The relationship between mental psychoses and alcohol was documented, and thus did the condemnation of alcohol as a poison assume scientific support. Finally, in 1915, whiskey and brandy were discreetly removed from the list of authoritative medicinal drugs contained in the United States Pharmacopoeia (Timberlake, 1963: 47).
Who were the people fueling the movement? Largely middle class, rural, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant comprised the temperance movement and they confronted the urban and industrial communities head-on. "The Anglo-Saxon stock is the best improved, hardiest and fittest.... [I]f we are to preserve this nation and the Anglo-Saxon type we must abolish [saloons]," proclaimed one temperance publication (Gusfield, 1963: 100). Calling itself "The Protestant church in action" (Sinclair, 1962: 108), the Anti-Saloon League concentrated single-mindedly and evangelically on the cause of temperance and refrained from dabbling in other reforms (Gusfield, 1963: 108).
Nevertheless, the Episcopal and Lutheran churches never aligned themselves with the AntiSaloon League, while Jewish and Catholic groups generally opposed their objective. The conviction shared by Anti-Saloon Leaguers expressed by Reverend Francis Ascott McBride was: "The League was born of God" (Lee, 1963: 35). Thus one had to be for or against the movement; there was no half-way commitment.
When the sides were lined up initially, industrialists and union leaders alike preferred to keep God on their side. From the company's point of view, the saloon was often responsible for industrial injuries and absenteeism. Some believed that the drinking man demanded higher wages than his sober counterparts. Furthermore, union locals tended to congregate in saloon meeting halls maintained for that purpose and, it was sometimes suspected, for the plottings of anarchistic conspirators (Furnas, 1968: 310).
Accordingly, it was not long before industry moved from an acquiescent position to an active role in the temperance movement. Various methods were adopted to encourage sobriety, including lectures, literature and job preferences for teetotalers. Businessmen opined that sobriety expanded productivity, increased bank deposits, improved collections and stimulated the retail trade (Timberlake, 1963: 67-79).
At the same time, the prospect of diverting patronage of the liquor industry to other products tantalized some industries. Thus the Welch Grape Juice Company advertised:
Get the Welch Habit-It's one that won't get you! (Timberlake, 1963: 77).
Opinion was not unanimous, of course. Businessmen, including bankers, whose interests were tied to the liquor industry could ill afford to be beneficent toward temperance. Others, including the DuPonts, Rockefellers, Kresges, and Wanamakers spent freely to cover the League's annual campaign costs of $2.5 million (Odegard, 1928: 126).
As surely as liquor was the enemy of the home, it was also proclaimed the enemy of the working man. "The great sinkhole for the workers' wages is the saloon," wrote the editors of one League publication, The California Liberator. "When that abomination is destroyed, labor is freed from its greatest curse" (Odegard, 1928: 53). The logic appealed to the union leadership. According to one official of the American Federation of Labor:
No force in our country has been as effective in the promotion of temperance among working people as the organized labor movement. The labor movement has achieved more for the cause of temperance than all the temperance societies combined ... (Timberlake, 1963: 83).
Since similar credit has been claimed for the League, the Protestant church, and business interests, it is difficult to apportion the plaudits. Subsequent events suggest that the labor interests failed to live up to this claim, however.
Notwithstanding Terrence V. Powerderly's early speech against "the strong right hand of labor itself . . . that carries with it the rum which drowns reason," his own Knights of Labor repealed their constitutional provision which denied membership to anyone connected with the liquor trade (Timberlake, 1963: 85-86).
As the reports of the National Commission on Enforcement of the Prohibition Laws (known as the "Wickersham Commission") were later to record, it was particularly the workers who resented the paternal legislation which they believed was directed at them and their habits (National Commission on Law Observance, 1931: 345).
In addition, there were. those whose livelihoods would be directly affected-indeed, effaced-by the success of the campaign: brewery workers, bartenders, glass workers, waiters, and musicians among others.
Thus, even though the Socialist Party resolved in 1908 that "any excessive indulgence in intoxicating liquors by members of the working class is a serious obstacle to the triumph of our cause since it impairs the vigor of the fighters in political and economic struggle" (Timberlake, 1963: 98), the industrial urban centers of the country continued to harbor and stimulate antagonism towards the temperance movement.
The identification of the saloon and its offerings with the urban, immigrant working class further enraged Prohibitionists. As one sociologist observed, "The saloon appeared as the symbol of a culture which was alien to the ascetic character of American values . . ." (Gusfield, 1963: 100). Thus, Americanism became a central issue in the temperance movement.
One temperance spokesman, cited in Barker's "The Saloon Problem," vented these sentiments:
The influx of foreigners into our urban centers, many of whom have liquor habits [sic], is a menace to good government. . . . [T] he foreign born population is largely under the social and political control of the saloon. If the cities keep up their rapid growth they will soon have the balance of political power in the nation and become storm centers of political life (Timberlake, 1963: 118).
1913-1933: NATIONAL PROHIBITION -- PROLOGUE AND FINISH
The distrust of the immigrant population became more pronounced as the economic, political, and social power of the cities developed. It was given a strong impetus by the anti-German tremors which shook the country in a mood of anticipation before World War 1.
The United States Brewers Association misread the prevailing temper and associated itself with the German-American Alliance to oppose the temperance advocates and defend German kultur in the United States.
As the United States came closer to war, the antipathy which developed against the Central Powers was directed with equal force against brewers and tipplers (Furnas, 1968: 334-35) :
Pro-Germanism is the only froth from the German's beer saloon. Our German Socialist Party and the German American Alliance are the spawn of the saloon. . . . Prohibition is the infallible submarine chaser (Sinclair, 1962:122).
The war gave the prohibition cause new ammunition. Literature depicted brewers and licensed retailers as treacherously stabbing American soldiers in the back. Raw materials and labor were being diverted from the war effort to an industry which debilitated the nation's capacity to defend itself. It was urged that wartime prohibition would stop the waste of grain and molasses and would remove a handicap on workers' efficiency.
"Liquor is a menace to patriotism because it puts beer before country," preached Prohibitionist Wayne Wheeler (Odegard, 1928: 72). The fact that names Pabst, Schlitz, and Blatz broadcast their national origin only did further injury to their interests.
In this atmosphere the Wartime Prohibition Act was passed in 1918. It followed a series of federal laws such as the Wilson Original Packages Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act, attempts to protect dry states from their wet neighbors.
The Wilson Original Packages Act was passed on August 8, 1890, and provided that all intoxicating beverages shipped interstate would be subject to the laws of the destination state upon arrival. No mechanism for federal enforcement was provided.
The Webb-Kenyon Act, enacted March 1, 1913, was intended to reinforce the 1890 Act by providing that it was a violation of federal law to ship an intoxicating beverage interstate with the intent that it be used or sold in any manner in violation of the laws of the destination state. The lack of federal enforcement rendered the statute virtually meaningless.
The Reed Amendment, enacted four years later, provided a fine of $1,000 for transporting liquor into a dry state with no greater effect.
None of the earlier acts met with substantial success in curbing the flow of liquor into purportedly dry regions, but they did mark a change in federal policy. Formerly liquor laws were designed solely to produce federal revenue; Congress now took cognizance of the role it could play in the regulation of consumption.
The role was actually forced upon a reluctant Congress at first. Indeed, the government had passed up numerous prior opportunities to involve itself in the temperance movement as such. The particular part it was to play was forecast by the Sons of Temperance who, in 1856, declared themselves for national constitutional prohibition.
Twenty years later, Congressman Henry Blair of New Hampshire introduced a prohibition amendment to the Constitution for the first time in Congress. As a senator, he introduced another such resolution in 1885, along with Senator Preston Plum of Kansas. After consideration by the Senate Committee on Education, the bill was reported out favorably and placed on the Senate Calendar in 1886. Nevertheless, no action resulted (Cherrington, 1920: 317 ).
In the meantime, states continued the struggle between the wets and the drys, with great success for the temperance advocates. By 1913, nine states were under stateside prohibition. In 31 other states, local option laws were in effect. By reason of these and other variants of regulatory schemes, more than 50% of the United States population was then under prohibition.
The national constitutional campaign was resumed as such in 1913 when the Anti-Saloon League went on record at its 15th National Convention in favor of immediate prosecution of the objective of constitutional amendment.
The National Temperance Council, founded at the same time, coordinated the activities of numerous temperance organizations with the same object. In 1913, the demands of the League were formally presented to Congress by the Committee of 1,000.
The measure was then introduced in the House by Congressman Thompson and in the Senate by Senator Sheppard. The following year, the first joint resolution failed to secure the necessary two thirds majority for submitting a constitutional amendment to the states. A second resolution was submitted in 1915 and favorably considered by the Judiciary Committees of both houses, but neither ever came to a vote.
Ultimately, in 1917, the resolution to prohibit the manufacture, sale, transportation or importation of alcoholic beverages in the United States was approved by Congress and sent to the states for ratification (Cherrington, 1920: 317-330).
It took only one year and eight days for the 18th Amendment to secure the necessary ratification. On January 8, 1918, Mississippi proudly became the first state to ratify, and on January 16, 1919, Nebraska completed the job as the 36th state (Lee, 1963: 42). By the end of February 1919, there remained only three hold-outs: New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island (Cherrington, 1920: 330).
October 28, 1919, was the day that Congress enacted the National Prohibition Act-more often known as the Volstead Act-with the intent to give effect to the new constitutional amendment. Officially, the liquor drought was to begin on January 17, 1920. The celebrants of the occasion were concentrated in the membership of the Anti-Saloon League, which could rightly claim that its consummate skill in pressure politics had maneuvered the country into its dry state.
The early experience of the Prohibition era gave the government a taste of what was to come. In the three months before the 18th Amendment became effective, liquor worth half a million dollars was stolen from Government warehouses. By midsummer of 1920, federal courts in Chicago were overwhelmed with some 600 pending liquor violation trials (Sinclair, 1962: 176-177). Within three years, 30 prohibition agents were killed in service.
Other statistics demonstrated the increasing volume of the bootleg trade. In 1921, 95,933 illicit distilleries, stills, still works and fermentors were seized. in 1925, the total jumped to 172,537 and up to 282,122 in 1930. In connection with these seizures, 34,175 persons were arrested in 1921; by 1925, the number had risen to 62,747 and to a high in 1928 of 75,307 (Internal Revenue, Service, 1921, 1966, 1970: 95, 6, 73). Concurrently, convictions for liquor offenses in federal courts rose from 35,000 in 1923 to 61,383 in 1932.
The law could not quell the continuing demand for alcoholic products. Thus, where legal enterprises could no longer supply the demand, an illicit traffic developed, from the point of manufacture to consumption. The institution of the speakeasy replaced the institution of the saloon. Estimates of the number of speakeasies throughout the United States ranged from 200,000 to 500,000 (Lee, 1963: 68).
Writers of this period point out that the law was circumvented by various means. Although there may have been legitimate, medicinal purposes for whiskey, the practice of obtaining a medical prescription for the illegal substance was abused. It is estimated that doctors earned $40 million in 1928 by writing prescriptions for whiskey.
The legal system was equally evasive; the courts convicted about seven percent of those charged with liquor violations (Sinclair, 1962: 193-195; Dobyns, 1940: 292). The exception for sacramental wine from protection under the Volstead Act also invited abuse. In 1925, the Department of Research and Education of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ reported that:
The withdrawal of wine on permit from bonded warehouses for sacramental purposes amounted in round figures to 2,139,000 gallons in the fiscal year 1922; 2,503,500 gallons in 1923; and 2,944,700 gallons in 1924. There is no way of knowing what the legitimate consumption of fermented sacramental wine is but it is clear that the legitimate demand does not increase 800,000 gallons in two years (Dobyns, 1940: 297).
The smuggling trade was revived with new vigor and new incentives. Rum-runners, often under foreign flags, brought liquor into the country from Belgium and Holland. In 1923, there were 134 seizures of such vessels. The following year, 236 were apprehended (History of the Alcohol . . . 928). With fewer risks, liquor was readily smuggled across the Canadian border. One way or the other, the Department of Commerce estimated that, as of 1924, liquor valued at approximately $40 million was entering the United States annually (Sinclair, 1962: 198).
The manufacture of "near-beer" and industrial alcohol provided other opportunities for diversion from licit channels, while the salvage of the California grape industry was section 29 of the Volstead Act (27 U.S.C. � 46) which authorized the home production of fermented fruit juices. Although the section was allegedly inserted to save the vinegar industry and the hard cider of America's farmers, it was welcomed by home winemakers as well. In the spirit of cooperation, the grape growers even produced a type of grape jelly suggestively called "Vine-go" which, with the addition of water, could make a strong wine within two months (Sinclair, 1962: 206).
One of the great ironies of the prohibition era was the fact, noted by the Wickersham Commission, that women happily took to drink during the experimental decade, and, what is more, did so in public. As the counterpart of the WCTU, the Women's Organization for National Prohibition Reform was founded, stating in its declaration of principles that Prohibition was "wrong in principle" and "disastrous in consequences in the hypocrisy, the corruption, the tragic loss of life and the appalling increase of crime which has attended the abortive attempt to enforce it" (Dobyns, 1940: 107).
Drinking at an earlier age was also noted, particularly during the first few years of Prohibition. The superintendents of eight state mental hospitals reported a larger percentage of young patients during Prohibition (1919-1926) than formerly. One of the hospitals noted: "During the past year (1926), an unusually large group of patients who are of high school age were admitted for alcoholic psychosis" (Brown, 1932:176).
In determining the age at which an alcoholic forms his drinking habit, it was noted: "The 1920-1923 group were younger than the other groups when the drink habit was formed" (Pollock, 1942: 113).
AVERAGE AGE AT FORMATION OF DRINK HABIT
Period
Males
Females
1914
21.4
27.9
1920-23
20.6
25.8
1936-37
23.9
31.7
To be sure, the Volstead Act was enforced in the United States wherever it had popular support. In the rural South and West prohibition was effective and in some cases still is. The failures of prohibition enforcement were spotlighted in the big cities where the law was flagrantly defied and in the smaller towns, populated by miners and industrial workers, where the law was simply ignored (National Commission on Law Observance, 1931: 345).
Notwithstanding the weak enforcement of the Volstead Act, some believe that it was only the coming of the Depression with its demand for increased employment and tax revenues which finally killed the experiment (Gusfield, 1963: 127). Others observe that Prohibition was a by-product of the stress and excesses of war and could not have survived in peacetime even under optimal economic conditions (Sinclair, 1962: 23-24). Finally, there are those who accuse the selfishly motivated businessmen of the United States for repeal which they allegedly brought about through the same high-pressure tactics so successfully employed by the partisans of temperance in the preceding decades (Dobyns, 1940: 5-130 passim).
Despite mixed motivations, the repeal movement was financed and driven by the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment (AAPA).
The members declared that "the principal business and objective of the Association shall be to educate its members as to the fundamental provisions, objects and purposes of the Constitution of the United States" (Dobyns, 1940: 5). They worked for the election of Congressmen who agreed to submit the question of repeal to a vote of the people in each state. They were successful fund-raisers and by January 1, 1931, had almost $3 million in cash in the bank (Dobyns, 1940: 9).
The sources of the funds included a number of converts from the dry cause. In 1928, the DuPont family abandoned the drys, followed in 1932 by John D. Rockefeller and S. S. Kresge (Gusfield, 1963: 128). Their conversion was effected under the strong influence of the income tax. Doggedly, Pierre S. DuPont circulated a brochure concluding that "the British liquor policy applied in the United States would permit the total abolition of the income tax both personal and corporate" (Dobyns, 1940: 22).
Concern for the effects of the prohibition laws was not limited to the private, wealthy sector. In 1928, a dry-wet confrontation emerged in the presidential election between Alfred E. Smith, a Catholic New Yorker, and Herbert Hoover. Hoover solemnly praised the "great social and economic experiment" and tightened his grip on the dry vote.
Notwithstanding the popular image of Smith as a staunch wet, his platform tried to avoid any outright repeal sentiment. He asked instead for an amendment of the Volstead Act which would provide a "scientific definition of the alcoholic content of an intoxicating beverage." This would enable each state to interpret and apply the federal standard within its borders. In addition, he favored what was to be known as the "state store" system of manufacturing and dispensing alcoholic beverages (Lee, 1963: 212).
In retrospect, it is difficult to ascertain whether it was the religious campaign or the dry campaign which defeated Al Smith. H. L. Mencken may have written accurately that "if [Al Smith] loses, it will be because those who fear the Pope outnumber those who are tired of the Anti-Saloon League" ('Sinclair, 1962: 303). Nevertheless, Prohibition survived the 1928 election, as did Hoover's campaign pledge to establish a commission to investigate the conditions under Prohibition. Head of the Commission was George W. Wickersham, former Attorney General under Taft. Although the Commission's purpose was set forth as an examination of the problems of enforcement, it soon decided to undertake much broader policy considerations.
The Commission's report, published in 1931, included opinion surveys, statistics on the number of deaths connected with enforcement efforts, testimony by consultants and experts, and an analysis of the organization, personnel and methods of prohibition enforcement. On the basis of the five volume report, the Wickersham Commission ironically concluded in its summary that:
There have been more sustained pressures to enforce this law than on the whole has been true of any other federal statute, although this pressure in the last four or five years has met with increasing resistance as the sentiment against prohibition has developed . . . . That a main source of difficulty is in the attitude of at least a very large number of respectable citizens in most of our large cities and in several states, is made more clear when the enforcement of the national prohibition act is compared with the enforcement of the laws as to narcotics. There is an enormous margin of profit in breaking the latter. The means of detecting transportation are more easily evaded than in the case of liquor. Yet there are no difficulties in the case of narcotics beyond those involved in the nature of the traffic because the laws against them are supported everywhere by a general and determined public sentiment (Sinclair, 1962: 367-368).
Notwithstanding this dire analysis, 10 out of the 11 commissioners signed a summary of conclusions of the report which stated that the Commission as a whole opposed the repeal of the 18th Amendment, the entry of the Federal or state governments into liquor business, or even the modification of national prohibition to permit the sale of light wines and beer (Sinclair, 1962: 364).
Walter Lippmann commented, "What was done was to evade a direct and explicit official confession that Federal prohibition is a hopeless failure" (Sinclair, 1962: 365). Whether or not Lippmann correctly read the Commission's intentions, there was clearly a gap between the input and the outcome of the report.
It is difficult to assess the relative numbers of the wet and dry partisans during the last few years of national prohibition. In terms of strength, however, the wets surely had the edge which less than two decades before had belonged to the drys. The new wet strength showed up at the National Convention of the Democratic party held in Chicago in 1932, where Mayor Cermak of that city filled the galleries with his supporters. And, though Franklin D. Roosevelt had wooed the dry vote for some time, he now came forward on a platform which favored the outright repeal of the 18th Amendment. Accepting his nomination, he stated:
I congratulate this convention for having had the courage, fearlessly to write into its declaration of principles what an overwhelming majority here assembled really thinks about the 18th Amendment. This convention wants repeal. Your candidate wants repeal. And I am confident that the United States of America wants repeal (Dobyns, 1940: 160).
While dry leaders looked on with disgust, Roosevelt was elected president and Congress turned a somersault. The repeal amendment was introduced February 14, 1933, by Sen. Blaine of Wisconsin and approved two days later by the Senate 63 to 23. The House followed four days later, voting 289 to 121 to send the amendment on to the States (Lee, 1963: 231). It required approval by 36 states. Michigan was the first state to ratify it; 39 states voted, on the amendment during 1933, with 37 approving its ratification and two-North and South Carolina-voting against its ratification. The final ratification was accomplished on November 7,1933, when Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Utah gave their approval.
Congress officially adopted the 21st Amendment to the Constitution on December 5, 1933.
Within three weeks of taking office, President Roosevelt witnessed the first sales of 3.2 beer, following a redefinition by statute of the terms "intoxicating liquors." The more popular, higher alcohol-content beer was relegalized by Congress under the Cullen-Harrison Act. Sale of beer became legal on April 7, 1933, in the District of Columbia and the 20 states where state laws did not prohibit its sale. During the next four years the remaining states changed their laws to permit its sale, with Alabama and Kansas in 1937, as the last to join the legal sale ranks.
The job of total repeal was accomplished with the help of the determined AAPA during the succeeding year. Their lawyers assisted the states in preparing bills for conventions and release of various forms of political propaganda, thereby enacting a serious satire on the 1919 campaign launched by the Anti-Saloon League. Notwithstanding their high and enduring constitutional principles, on December 31, 1933, with repeal a reality, the AAPA ceased to exist and sent its files to the Library of Congress. "Having attained its objective . . . the Association resisted the temptation to linger on as a 'sentinel of American liberty' '', the New York Times observed in the organization's obituary (Dobyns, 1940: 132).
PROHIBITION IN PERSPECTIVE
During 13 years, what did Prohibition accomplish? There is no single compilation of Prohibition statistics which would enable us to determine the degree of success which Prohibition enjoyed during its lifetime.
In discussing the relative successes and failures of Prohibition, most observers conclude that the undertaking failed. "Prohibition destroyed the manufacturing and distributive agencies through which the demand for liquor had been legally supplied. But the demand remained" (Hu, 1950: 51).
In its Report on the Enforcement of the Prohibition Laws of the United States, the Wickersham Commission concluded that the country had prohibition in law but not in fact. They reported:
There was general prevalence of drinking in homes, clubs and hotels.... Throughout the country people of wealth, businessmen and professional men and their families, and the higher paid workingmen and their families, are drinking in large numbers in open flouting of the law. And neither Congress nor the states set up adequate machinery or appropriated sufficient funds for the enforcement of the prohibitory legislation. Federal and state legislation, as a matter of fact, strove to satisfy so that, as it was aptly said, the drys had their prohibition law and the wets had their liquor (Hu, 1950: 52).
Although some view the theory of prohibition as reasonable, it is generally conceded that the realities of manufacture and distribution make it unworkable, for in one form or another, alcohol can be easily produced by farmers, high school chemistry students, and ordinary citizens.
Prohibition has been attempted many times in various parts of the world; except for some Moslem areas, attempted legislative controls have not proven adequate. In spite of many sincere and determined efforts, no country in Europe or the Americas has yet succeeded in eliminating the use of alcohol by society by legislative fiat (H.E.W., 1968: 41).
Those who had been accustomed to using alcoholic beverages sought other sources of supply "in disregard of the legislative mandate. In the presence of high pecuniary returns there [was] a strong tendency for supply to meet demand in spite of prohibition" (Hu, 1950: 51).
Consumption. Although it is impossible to make an accurate determination of the consumption of alcoholic beverages under Prohibition-since there are no statistics compiled regarding the output and sale of the outlaw industry-estimates have been made by those examining the economic results of Prohibition as well as by the Bureau of Prohibition of the U.S. Department of Justice. The Bureau placed the consumption of alcoholic beverages at 73,831,172 gallons, or 0.6 gallon per capita in fiscal year 1930 as contrasted with 166,983,681 gallons or 1.7 gallons per capita in 1914.
In terms of pure alcohol, the Bureau concluded that per capita consumption in 1930 was 35% of the 1914 rate of legal consumption. These estimates have been criticized as being far too low (Tillitt, 1932: 35).
The figures published by the Department of Commerce in the Statistical Abstract of the United States reflect a different picture. The average annual per capita consumption of hard liquor from 1910-1914, inclusive, was 1.46 proof gallons. "This 5-year period was before the rise of abnormal conditions coincident to the World War and may be taken as fairly indicative of the normal rate of drinking that prevailed in the Pre-Prohibition era" (Rosenbloom, 1935: 51).
The per capita rate for the Prohibition years is computed to be 1.63 proof gallons. This is 11.64% higher than the Pre-Prohibition rate (Tillitt, 1932: 35). Based on these figures one observer concluded: "And so the drinking which was, in theory, to have been decreased to the vanishing point by Prohibition has, in fact, increased" (Tillitt, 1932: 36).
Others disagree with the implications of these unverified statistics noting that persons of limited means, formerly unable to patronize the expensive speakeasies, once again had cheap access to alcohol following repeal and thereby increased consumption (Harrison & Laine, 1936: 1).
Popular opinion is equally inconclusive; a survey conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion in 1936 asked whether conditions (drinking customs, consumption, etc.) were better worse or without significant change since Repeal 36% indicated a worsening and 31% could see no appreciable change (Harrison & Laine, 1936: 2). Perhaps indicative of a gradual process of adjustment, however, the results of later Gallup polls suggest a gradual decline in the use of alcohol. Of a national sample, 67% indicated they used alcohol in 1945, in contrast to 60% in 1950 and 55% in 1958 (Gusfield, 1963: 135).
Alcoholic Psychoses. There was a notable decrease in alcoholic psychoses and in deaths due to alcoholism immediately preceding the enactment of Prohibition and a gradual increase in alcoholic psychosis and in deaths from alcoholism in the general population since 1920.
"These facts appear to indicate that since 1920, Prohibition [was] increasingly impotent as a means of preventing excessive use of alcohol to an extent productive of serious mental disorders and untimely death. 1920 marks the end of the decline and the beginning of the rise in the trends of alcoholic mental diseases and of deaths from alcoholism in the general population" (Brown, 1932: 88).
The increase in mental disorders and deaths from alcoholism after 1920, however, also coincides with the heavy consumption period-early 1900's-which would have resulted in an increase in alcoholism some years later.
The following table reflects the decrease prior to 1920 and the subsequent gradual increase in percentage of alcoholic psychosis among new admissions to 56 hospitals in 25 states as well as among admissions to New York civil state hospitals (Brown, 1932: 76-77; Malzburg, 1949: 294) :
56 Hospitals
Year
All new admissions
New admissions with alcoholic psychoses
NY State - civil hospital percent admission with alcoholic psychoses.
Number
Percent
1910
17,439
1,486
8.5
...
1911
17,299
1,366
7.9
…
1912
17,570
1,567
8.9
...
1913
17,525
1,633
9.3
9.3
1914
19,134
1,573
8.2
7.4
1915
18,875
1,331
7.1
5.7
1916
17,929
1,370
7.6
6.1
1917
20,041
1,576
7.9
8.2
1918
19,741
1,021
5.2
5.2
1919
19,737
841
4.3
4.1
1920
19,579
485
2.5
2.0
1921
20,368
567
2.8
2.8
1922
20,741
798
3.8
3.2
1923
20,316
861
4.2
4.0
1924
19,818
896
4.9
5.4
1925
20,857
1,017
4. 9
5.8
1926
20,911
997
4.8
5.9
1927
21,982
1,268
5.8
7.0
1928
23,293
1,257
5.4
6.0
1929
23,242
1,380
5.9
6.2
1930
24,100
1,251
5.2
6.0
Deaths from Alcoholism. In New York City, from 1900 through 1909, there was an average of 526 deaths annually attributable to alcoholism. From 1910 through 1917, the average number was 619. It plummeted to 183 for the years 1918 through 1922. Thereafter, the figure rose, averaging a new high of 639 for the years 1923 through 1927 (Rice, ed., 1930: 122).
Total deaths from alcoholism in the United States show a comparable trend, with the gradual increase resuming somewhat earlier, about 1922 (Brown, 1932: 61, 77; Feldman, 1927: 397; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1924: 55).
Year
Deaths from all causes rate per 100,000
Deaths from alcoholism rate per 100,000
1910
1,496.1
5.4
1911
1,418.1
4.9
1912
1,388.8
5.3
1913
1,409.6
5.9
1914
1,364.6
4.9
1915
1,355.0
4.4
1916
1,404.3
5.8
1917
1,425.5
5.2
1918
1,809.1
2.7
1919
1,287.4
1.6
1920
1,306.0
1.0
1921
1,163.9
1.8
1922
1,181.7
2.6
1923
1,230.1
3.2
1924
1,183.5
3.2
1925
1,182.3
3.6
1926
1,222.7
3.9
1927
1,141.9
4.0
1928
1,204.1
4.0
1929
1,192.3
3.7
The highest death rates from alcoholism occurred during the decade prior to Prohibition as did the highest death rates from cirrhosis of the liver. These statistics should be qualified by the observations of Dr. Charles Morris, Chief Medical Examiner for New York City: "In making out death certificates (which are basic to Census Reports) private or family physicians commonly avoid entry of alcoholism as a cause of death whenever possible. This practice was more prevalent under the National Dry Law than it was in preprohibition time" (Tillitt, 1932: 114-115).
Even if reliable, per se, such statistics may be unrelated to the consumption of alcoholic beverages in any given year. Another writer of this period noted: "The relation of fatal alcoholic diseases to consumption of alcohol must be one extending over a long period of years and the actual duration of the critical period can hardly be estimated" (Jellinek, 1942: 48-1). According to one sociologist, rates of alcoholism and related mental and physical diseases reflect past drinking habits, developed ten to 15 years earlier (Gusfield, 1963: 119).
A shorter "lead time" is suggested by a mental hygiene statistician who attributes the temporary reduction in alcoholic psychoses "to the legal restriction of the sale and use of alcoholic beverages, made effective by the support of public opinion which during the war period had discountenanced self-indulgence, of all sorts" (Brown, 1932: 88). He adds, however, that the notable increase in alcoholic psychoses and deaths from alcoholism towards the end of the prohibition era (1927-1932) indicated that:
... since 1920, prohibition has become increasingly impotent as a means of preventing excessive use of alcohol to an extent productive of serious mental disorders and untimely deaths (Brown, 1932: 88).
The highly limited statistical label of death from alcoholism has been noted elsewhere:
The trend of death from alcoholism reflects hardly anything else than progress in the treatment of the so-called diseases of chronic alcoholism. Nevertheless, statistics of death from alcoholism have been used by both Drys and Wets to prove that Prohibition or repeal has greatly improved the rate of death from alcoholism. . . . Death from alcoholism is simply not an index of the prevalence of inebriety. Death from alcoholism could fall to zero in response to medical progress, while at the same time the rate of inebriety might rise many fold (Jellinek, 1947: 39).
Arrests Arrests for drunkenness also provide a source of information about the extent of drinking in the United States. It must be noted, however, that statistics of this sort vary with local police policies. For example, during a six-year period in the 1930's, the arrests for drunkenness were from 14 to 31 times higher in Philadelphia than in New York (Kolb, 1941: 608).
Nevertheless, gross statistics drawn from 383 cities indicate that arrests for drunkenness per 10,000 population reached a high of 192 in 1916 and fell to 71 in 1920. From this level, they rose steadily again to reach 157 in 1928 (Warburton, 1932: 102). Of course, arrests prior to Prohibition may not bear the same relation to the use of alcohol as they did subsequently, Warburton theorizes:
. . . [U]nder Prohibition, especially during the early years, police were more strict in making arrests, and . . . a larger proportion than formerly of persons appearing on the streets under the influence of liquor are arrested. Also, since the sale of liquor is illegal and cannot be obtained in public saloons, and when the police are more strict in arresting intoxicated persons, it is reasonable to suppose that drinking is less public and that fewer drunken persons appear on the streets relative to the quantity of liquor consumed (Warburton, 1932: 103).
Nevertheless, the cyclical trend suggested by these figures coincides with statistics on alcoholism (Brown, 1932: 61, 71, 77). Whatever their independent validity, however, they correlate earth the theory of one author that:
[T] he 18th Amendment could not have been passed without the support of the psychologically tolerant, made temporarily intolerant by the stress of war. But when the moderates deserted the drys in the time of peace, the hard core of the movement was revealed (Sinclair, 1962: 23--24).
Without the support of the moderates, the author theorizes, Prohibition was to become itself a symbol of excess, unsupported by the vast majority of the population.
Outcome. What, then, did Prohibition accomplish? To a great extent it eliminated the saloon from American life. While bars and taverns reopened joyfully following repeal, they ceased to be the centers of systematic political corruption and debauchery which they had once been. Part of this may be attributable to the greater sophistication of the electorate and politics generally. Part, no doubt, is owing to the fact that women were welcome as customers in the new cocktail lounges, having shown themselves to be eager patrons of the speakeasies.
And finally, the change in the character of the saloon was effected by public determination that it should be changed. This attitude was expressed in the post-repeal statutes concerned with the physical appearance of the saloon and the character of persons authorized to operate them.
Prohibition did make the nation conscious that corruption of the law and of the populace may be the consequence of a law which is not reflective of the morals and mores of the time. It played out some of the deepest social class resentments, culminating in the realization that the behavioral standards of some could not be impressed upon others. It demonstrated that the fervor of war and the cult of patriotism may be abused-and abuse the country in return.
Repeal reimposed the burden of regulation upon the states. They were required to develop a system of control directed at the particular objectives they wished to achieve. The post-repeal era was to prove an exercise not only in states' rights but in states' responsibilities.
1933-1971: AFTER THE DELUGE
On December 4, 1933, the day before final ratification of the repeal amendment, the President established the Federal Alcohol Control Administration, pursuant to Executive Order No. 6474. FACA was to have the power to grant or revoke permits to engage in the alcoholic beverage industry-not the brewing industry-as well as the power to control plant capacity and production; it was also to engage in consumer protection through regulations designed to prevent misbranding and false advertising of alcoholic beverages. In addition, FACA prohibited the ownership of retail outlets by manufacturers and wholesalers (Harrison & Laine, 1936: 24-29).
This scheme fell under the Schecter Poultry decision by the Supreme Court. The Treasury, Federal Trade, Commission and Food and Drug Administration then moved in. A new alcohol control agency was proposed, leading to a dispute as to whether it should be independent or part of the Treasury.
Joseph H. Choate, Jr., first head of the FACA, testified that:
The Treasury has not been an organization whose duty it was to study and understand the liquor business, the interest of the public in that business, or the method by which that business ought to be carried on in order to subserve the interests of both the public and state governments. It has been a creature of one idea, that one idea being, quite properly, to get revenue and get it as fast and as copiously as it could (Harrison & Laine, 1936: 33).
The Department of the Treasury agreed with Choate's analysis.
Nevertheless, this testimony was disregarded and the Federal Alcohol Administration was created as a division of Treasury in 1935. This arrangement was superseded in 1936 when the Liquor Tax Administration Act established FACA as an independent agency of the government. Soon thereafter it was reorganized, once again as an arm of the Department of Treasury, and even its separate identity was abolished as of June 30, 1940. Today, the Treasury retains full authority to administer all federal liquor laws.
The current federal laws regulating trade in intoxicating beverages may be classified in the following categories:
(1) Revenue: Taxes are imposed on rectifiers, brewers, manufacturers of stills, dealers; wholesale and retail stamps are required on distilled spirits (26 USC, 1971a).
(2) Criminal Penalties: Criminal penalties are provided for unauthorized production, sale or possession, transportation into states prohibiting sale, C.O.D. shipments and unlabeled shipments (26 USC, 1971b; 18 USC, 1971).
(3) Interstate Transportation: Interstate shipments of alcoholic beverages are subject to the laws of the receiving state (27 USC, 1971a).
(4) Permits: Importers, manufacturers and sellers of intoxicating beverages must have permits (27 USC, 1971b).
(5) Unfair Practices: Exclusive sales arrangements, tying, bribery and false advertising or labeling are prohibited (27 USC, 1971b).
The intent of the Federal Government to reserve all decisions regarding regulation of consumption is quite clear from federal statutes presently in force. The states have reacted with a variety of regulatory schemes controlling to varying degrees the seller, the buyer, the place, time and opportunity for sale and, through revenue measures, the cost.
In 18 states, the state store or state monopoly system has entirely displaced the private wholesale or retail sale of intoxicating beverages. Other states permit the sale of liquor, wine and beer through private, licensed outlets.
The license system may be implemented by different, means. Administration may be solely by the state, or control may be shared by the counties or municipalities.
Local control may be exercised to a greater or lesser degree. For example, in the 1930's, immediately after repeal, Massachusetts and New Mexico permitted local boards to grant retail licenses only after investigation and approval of applicants by the state board. During the same period, other states, predominantly in the South, gave local authorities supplemental powers to issue licenses while requiring concurrent state licenses as well.
In some jurisdictions, the local license had to be obtained first, and the state license could be granted thereafter. In Illinois, however, the state commission's power was curtailed by requiring that a state license be granted once the local license was secured. And although the state was given the power to revoke its license, it was given no power to inspect places of sale to determine grounds for revocation (Harrison & Laine, 1936: 50-53).
The license system has been suspect by many wets as well as drys because of the opportunities it may afford for political abuse. On the other hand, there is substantial opinion which holds direct participation in the sale of liquor in contempt. As to the relative efficacy of each, there are no reliable means of making a judgment. Each apparently depends on the integrity and capacity of the individuals charged with the job of enforcement and oversight.
Superimposed on the basic system of regulating the sale of liquor are other sumptuary laws which are directed at the purchaser. Sales are not permitted to minors or intoxicated persons. Credit is often prohibited on liquor sales as well. Criminal penalties may be imposed for driving under the influence of alcohol as well as for drunken behavior.
The sale of liquor by the drink is permitted in most states, but some still require that it be sold in packaged form only, reflecting the continuing fear of the resurrection of the saloon. In many states Sunday closing laws are enforced, and mandatory closing times are imposed upon bars and package stores alike. Sales are prohibited almost uniformly on Election Day, at least during polling hours, and, in many places, on Thanksgiving, Memorial Day, Christmas and other holidays.
Local option is still granted in most states, in voting units ranging from the plantation to the city or county. Of the monopoly or control states, only Utah and Wyoming fail to make provision for local option at all. Wyoming maintains a state monopoly at the wholesale level only. Private retailer sellers are licensed.
In the remaining monopoly states, it is often possible for towns within a wet county to go dry, and sometimes vice versa. Of the 33 license states, only 10 (including the District of Columbia) do not permit local option at any level.
Notwithstanding the various patterns of regulation, Senator Arthur Capper's words of the 1930's still seem to be correct:
We can repeal prohibition, but we cannot repeal the liquor problem (Peterson, 1969: 126).
Neither the states nor the population have yet come to grips with the problems of alcoholism and alcohol abuse. Both the monopoly system and the license system are directed at other concerns. They, no more than Prohibition, have been able to control or even alleviate the very real and dire consequences of alcohol use by society.
References
Brown, F. W.: "Prohibition and mental Hygiene" Annals, 163: 61, 71, 76-77, 88, 1176 (September, 1932).
Cherrington, E. H.: The Evolution of Prohibition In The United States of America, Westerville, Ohio: American Issue Press (1920), pp. 16, 18, 37-38, 49-51, 58, 92-93, 134, 156-162, 165-169, 250-251, 317-330.
Dobyns, F.: The Amazing Story of Repeal, Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co. (1940), pp. 5, 5-130 passim, 9, 22, 107, 132, 160, 215, 292, 297.
Feldman, H.: "Prohibition: Its Economic and Industrial Aspects," New York City: Appleton and Co. (1927), p. 397.
Furnas, J. C.: The Life and Times of the Late Demon Rum, New York City: Putnam (1965), pp. 15, 80, 167, 183, 273, 281, 310, 334-335.
Grant: "The Liquor Traffic Before the 18th Amendment,"
Annals, 163: 1, 5 (September, 1932).
Gustield, J. R.: The Symbolic Crusade, Urbana: University of Illinois Press (1963), pp. 69-70, 76-77, 100, 108, 119, 127-128, 135.
Harrison, L. V. and Laine, E.: After Repeal, New York
Health, Education and Welfare: "Alcohol and Alcoholism," p. 41 (1968). Prepared for National Clearinghouse for Mental Health Information.
History of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, pp. 1420, 28 (undated, unsigned monograph in the library of the Distilled Spirits Institute).
Hu, T.: The Liquor Tax in the U.S.: 1791-1947, New York City: Columbia University Press (1950), pp. 48, 51-52. Internal Revenue Service: "Alcohol and Tobacco Summary Statistics," pp. 6, 73, 95 (1966, 1970, 1921).
Jellinek, E. M.: "Death From Alcoholism in the U.S. in 1940," Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 3 (3): 484 (December, 1942).
: "Recent Trends in Alcoholism," Quartely Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 8 (1) : 39 (September, 1947).
Kolb., L.: "Alcoholism and Public Health," Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 1: 608, 610, 613 (March, 1941).
Krout, J. A.: The Origins of Prohibition, New York City: Russell & Russell (1967), pp. 29-30.
Lee, H.: How Dry We Were: Prohibition Revisited, EngleWood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc. (1963), pi). 15-16, 1819, 22-23, 29-30, 34-35, 42, 68, 212, 231.
Malzburg, B.: "A Study of First Admissions with Alcohol Psychoses in New York State 1943-44," Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 10: 294 (December, 1949). Miller, P. and Johnson, T. H. (eds.) : 11 The Puritans, New York City: American Book Co. (1963), pp. 430-431.
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement: "Report On The Enforcement of the, Prohibition Laws of the U.S.," H.R. Doe. No. 722, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 8, 345 (1931).
Odegard, P. H.: Pressure Politics-The Story of The AntiSaloon League, New York City: Columbia University Press (1928), pp. 23, 40-60, 53, 70-72, 126.
Peterson, W.: "Vitalizing Liquor Control," Journal of Criminal Law and Crime, 40: 119-120, 122-123, 126 (July, 1939).
Pollock, H. M.: Mental Disease and Social Welfare, Utica, N.Y.: State Hospital Press (1942), 1). 113.
Rice, S. A. (ed.) : Statistics In Social Studies, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press (1930), 1). 122.
Rosenbloom, M. V.: The Liquor Industry: A Surrey of Its History, Manufacture, Problems of Control and IMportance, Braddock: Ruffsdale Distilling Co. (1937 ed.), pp. 27, 51-52 (1935)).
Rush, B.: "Inquiry Into the Effects of Ardent Spirits Upon The Human Body and Mind," Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 4: 323,325-326 (September, 1943). Rutgers Center of Alcohol Studies: "Selected Statistics on Consumption of Alcohol (1850-1968) And On Alcoholism (1930-1968)," 1). 4 (1970).
Sinclair, A. : The Era of Excess, Boston: Little, Brown (1962), pp. 23-24, 43, 51, 108, 122, 176-177, 190, 193-195, 198, 206, 303, 364-365, 367-368.
Tillitt, M. H. : The Price of Prohibition, -New York City: Harcourt, Brace & Co. (1932), pp. 35-36, 114-115.
Timberlake, J. H.: Prohibition and the Progressive Morement, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1963), pp. 34-38, 42-55, 67-79, 83, 85-86, 98, 118.
Towne, C. IL: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, New York City: The MacMillan Co. (1923), pp. 211-212.
U.S. Department of Commerce: "U.S. Census Mortality Statistics," 55 (1924).
Warburton, C.: The Economic Results of Prohibition, New York City: Columbia University Press (1932), pp. 102104, 216.
This Study was released in 2010 but has very good information.
Abstract
The prevalence of both alcohol and cannabis use and the high morbidity associated with motor vehicle crashes has lead to a plethora of research on the link between the two. Drunk drivers are involved in 25% of motor vehicle fatalities, and many accidents involve drivers who test positive for cannabis. Cannabis and alcohol acutely impair several driving-related skills in a dose-related fashion, but the effects of cannabis vary more between individuals than they do with alcohol because of tolerance, differences in smoking technique, and different absorptions of Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active ingredient in marijuana. Detrimental effects of cannabis use vary in a dose-related fashion, and are more pronounced with highly automatic driving functions than with more complex tasks that require conscious control, whereas with alcohol produces an opposite pattern of impairment. Because of both this and an increased awareness that they are impaired, marijuana smokers tend to compensate effectively while driving by utilizing a variety of behavioral strategies. Combining marijuana with alcohol eliminates the ability to use such strategies effectively, however, and results in impairment even at doses which would be insignificant were they of either drug alone. Epidemiological studies have been inconclusive regarding whether cannabis use causes an increased risk of accidents; in contrast, unanimity exists that alcohol use increases crash risk. Furthermore, the risk from driving under the influence of both alcohol and cannabis is greater than the risk of driving under the influence of either alone. Future research should focus on resolving contradictions posed by previous studies, and patients who smoke cannabis should be counseled to wait several hours before driving, and avoid combining the two drugs.
1. Introduction
Accidents are the fifth leading cause of death in the US; nearly half are motor vehicle accidents, which according to the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) killed 38,588 people in 2006 alone.1 Motor vehicle accidents are the nation’s leading cause of death in those under 30.2 The contribution of drugs of abuse to this accident rate has attracted increasing attention in recent years because of the dramatic increase in drug use. In 2002, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) estimated that 22 million Americans—9.4% of the population—have a substance use or dependence problem. As marijuana is the most commonly used drug of abuse, having been tried by 40% of the population,3 and is also smoked most commonly in the age group that also has the most road traffic accidents, the contribution of marijuana smoking to road traffic accidents is of great concern to both governments and clinicians responsible for counseling patients with substance abuse problems. Moreover, given the paucity of data supporting marijuana’s acute toxicity, the most serious possible consequence of acute cannabis use is a road traffic accident from driving while intoxicated.4 The very high cost of crashes, both human and financial, underlines the importance of understanding the extent to which marijuana use contributes to such accidents. The purpose of this paper is to review the scientific evidence on the effects on driving while intoxicated with marijuana and contrast this with the effects of alcohol intoxication.
Looking for a frontline attorney that will fight in the trenchbeside you against the "justice" system ? Attorney Michael Komorn – provides aggressive DUI, drugged driving and criminal defense. Call The Office 248-357-2550 or visit KomornLaw.com
2. Epidemiology of marijuana smoking and road traffic accidents
The rising prevalence of cannabis use, its increased availability and potency,5 lower prices, widespread social tolerance, and earlier age of onset of use have combined to increase the number of users and hence the number of people subject to cannabis use disorders.6 Peak initiation is at age 18, and ten years later, 8% of users are marijuana-dependent.7 Most cannabis use is intermittent and time-limited, however; users generally stop in their mid-to-late 20s, and only a small minority continue in daily use over a period of years.8
Young people also account for a disproportionate number of road traffic accidents. According to the National Center for Statistics and Analysis, the fatality rate for teenagers is four times that of drivers age 25 to 69, and drivers under age 25 account for a quarter of all traffic fatalities.9 Risk factors for having a fatal traffic accident include being a young man, having psychological characteristics such as thrill-seeking and overconfidence, driving at excessive speed, driving late at night, failing to wear a seatbelt, and lacking familiarity with the vehicle.10 The risk factors for adolescent marijuana use are somewhat overlapping—delinquency (vandalism, shoplifting, joyriding etc.), poor school performance, and substance use by self and peers.11
The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) reported that in 25% of all motor vehicle crash fatalities, the driver had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.01 g/dL (one eighth the legal limit) or greater, and in 21-year-old drivers, that figure rose to 39%.12 Drivers with a previous DWI (“Driving While Impaired”) conviction were responsible for 7.2% of all crashes involving alcohol.
In comparison, the percentage of road traffic accidents in which one driver tested positive for marijuana ranges from 6% to 32%.13, 14 In one study, 9.7% of cannabis smokers reported having driven under the influence in the previous year; those who did drove while intoxicated an average of 8.1 times during the year.15 Among those who seek treatment for cannabis problems, more than 50% report having driven while “stoned” at least once in the previous year.16, 17
3. Studies relevant to marijuana and smoking
Three types of studies are generally performed to help assess the risk that smoking marijuana may increase the probability of having a fatal traffic accident. The first are cognitive studies that measure the effects of smoking marijuana on cognitive processes that are considered to be integral to safe driving. The second are experimental studies on the collision risk of people under the influence of marijuana. The third are descriptive and analytic epidemiological studies on the relationship between cannabis use and accidents, usually performed through drug testing of injured drivers.
3.1 Cognitive studies
Attentiveness, vigilance, perception of time and speed, and use of acquired knowledge are all affected by marijuana;18–21 in fact, a meta-analysis of 60 studies concluded that marijuana causes impairment in every performance area that can reasonably be connected with safe driving of a vehicle, such as tracking, motor coordination, visual functions, and particularly complex tasks that require divided attention,22 although studies on marijuana’s effects on reaction time have been contradictory.23 Similar conclusions have been reached by other reviewers.2 Worse still, marijuana and alcohol, when used together, have additive or even multiplicative effects on impairment.24 Consequently, on the basis of cognitive studies, it seems reasonable to propose that smoking marijuana may increase the risk of having a fatal traffic accident.
Alcohol at 0.75 g/kg (slightly less than four standard drinks) causes high levels of impairment in psychomotor performance and medium-to-high levels of impairment in such tasks as critical flicker fusion and short-term memory.25 Alcohol impairs pursuit tracking, divided attention, signal detection, hazard perception,26–28 reaction time, attention, concentration, and hand-eye coordination.29, 30
Alcohol also reduces the perceived negative consequences of risk-taking,31 which can increase willingness to take risks after drinking,32 the amount of risk-taking behavior while driving, even at low alcohol doses,33 and the incidence of road traffic accidents while driving drunk.34, 35 However, there is considerable variability in the effects that alcohol can have on people—the same dose may have different effects not only on different individuals, but also in the same individual on different occasions, because of other factors such as gender, body mass index, age, drinking habits, time of day, stomach contents, genetics, stage of the menstrual cycle, and environmental factors.36
3.2 Experimental research (driving and simulator studies)
Experimental research measures the potential risk of an accident using a driving simulator or driving course.
3.2.1 Studies that do not show impairment
Surprisingly, given the alarming results of cognitive studies, most marijuana-intoxicated drivers show only modest impairments on actual road tests.37, 38 Experienced smokers who drive on a set course show almost no functional impairment under the influence of marijuana, except when it is combined with alcohol.39
Many investigators have suggested that the reason why marijuana does not result in an increased crash rate in laboratory tests despite demonstrable neurophysiologic impairments is that, unlike drivers under the influence of alcohol, who tend to underestimate their degree of impairment, marijuana users tend to overestimate their impairment, and consequently employ compensatory strategies. Cannabis users perceive their driving under the influence as impaired and more cautious,40 and given a dose of 7 mg THC (about a third of a joint), drivers rated themselves as impaired even though their driving performance was not; in contrast, at a BAC 0.04% (slightly less than two “standard drinks” of a can of beer or small 5 oz. glass of wine; half the legal limit in most US states), driving performance was impaired even though drivers rated themselves as unimpaired.41 Binge drinkers are particularly likely to rate themselves as unimpaired, possibly because they tend to become less sedated by high doses of alcohol.42
This awareness of impairment has behavioral consequences. Several reviews of driving and simulator studies have concluded that marijuana use by drivers is likely to result in decreased speed and fewer attempts to overtake, as well as increased “following distance”. The opposite is true of alcohol.43 One review of eight driving simulator studies and seven on-road studies44 found that cannabis use was associated with either poor lane control41, 45–48 or slower driving that successfully maintained lane control.49–51 In seven of ten studies cited, cannabis use was associated with a decrease in driving speed despite explicit instructions to maintain a particular speed, whereas under the influence of alcohol, subjects consistently drove faster. Two simulator studies showed that the tendency to overtake was decreased with cannabis use but increased with alcohol.52, 53 One simulator study and two on-road studies examining car-following behavior concluded that cannabis smokers tend to increase the distance between themselves and the car in front of them.41, 45 Other studies have found no adverse effects of marijuana use on sign detection,49 a sudden lane-changing task,43 or the detection of and response to hazardous events.48
3.2.2 Studies that show impairment
Not all deficits can be compensated for through the use of behavioral strategies, however. Both alcohol and marijuana use increase reaction time and the number of incorrect responses to emergencies.43 Drivers under the influence of marijuana were not able to compensate for standard deviation of lateral position (SDLP, a measure of staying within lane), which increased with increasing doses of THC. This is a measure that is not subject to conscious compensatory mechanisms in the way that other aspects of driving are. Other studies have found poorer monitoring of the speedometer under the influence of marijuana,54 increased decision time when passing,52 increased time needed to brake when a light suddenly changes,55 and increased time to respond to a changing light45, 56 or sudden sound.57 Drivers also crashed more frequently into a sudden obstacle on a high dose of marijuana, although this did not happen at a low dose.45
Meta-analyses of over 120 studies have found that in general, the higher the estimated concentration of THC in blood, the greater the driving impairment, but that more frequent users of marijuana show less impairment than infrequent users at the same dose, either because of physiological tolerance or learned compensatory behavior. Maximal impairment is found 20 to 40 minutes after smoking, but the impairment has vanished 2.5 hours later, at least in those who smoke 18 mg THC or less (the dose often used experimentally to duplicate a single joint).58, 59
With increasing doses of alcohol, however, there is general dose-dependent lowering of both sustained attention and overall attentional capacity, with consequently more concentration paid to the main component of a complex skill (steering, for example), and less and less attention paid to secondary tasks (such as speed or driving skill). Functional imaging on the effects of increasing doses of alcohol up to a BAC of 0.08% in simulated driving has demonstrated that orbitofrontal areas (subsuming judgment) and motor areas are affected first, then cerebellar areas controlling coordination show functional deterioration, and finally, at high doses, global cognitive networks and simulated driving performance are impaired.60
Interestingly, three reports indicate that chronic marijuana smokers are less susceptible to impairment from alcohol on some measures compared with nonsmokers or infrequent smokers. As far back as 1970, Reese Jones noticed that alcohol’s effects were diminished in heavy cannabis smokers.61 A subsequent study showed that regular cannabis smokers demonstrate less of a decrement in peripheral signal detection under the influence of alcohol than do infrequent users,62 and a later study still found that regular cannabis users given alcohol alone showed less of a decrement in tracking accuracy and dizziness ratings than infrequent users given the same alcohol dose.63 The reason for this is unclear, but is hypothesized to result from either pharmacological or behavioral cross-tolerance between marijuana and alcohol.
3.2.3 Summary of experimental studies
It appears that cannabis use may impair some driving skills (automatic functions such as tracking) at smoked doses as low as 6.25 mg (a third of a joint), but different skills (complex functions that require conscious control) are not impaired until higher doses, and cannabis users tend to compensate effectively for their deficits by driving more carefully. Unexpected events are still difficult to handle under the influence of marijuana, however, and the combination of low-dose alcohol and low-dose cannabis causes much more impairment than either drug used alone.48, 64, 65 Alcohol appears to impair tasks requiring cognitive control more than it does automatic functions, whereas marijuana at a comparable dose impairs automatic functions more than those requiring cognitive control. Together, the effects on impairment are additive and may even be synergistic. Chronic marijuana smokers are less impaired by both alcohol and marijuana than would be expected, however.
3.3 Epidemiologicalstudies
One weakness of driving studies is that subjects are aware of being observed and assessed, so such studies are generally a better measure of what drivers are capable of doing rather than what they actually do. Epidemiological studies attempt to assess the actual risk that a driver may cause an accident under the influence of a drug, relative to that of a sober person driving under similar conditions. The relative risk is expressed in the form of an “odds ratio” (OR), which is the multiplier for the increased accident risk from driving under the influence of marijuana. Two approaches are taken. The first is culpability studies, which classify drivers who have crashed according to their degree of responsibility for the crash, then compare drug use in each category. If there is greater use of the drug in those culpable for crashes, then the drug is judged to be responsible for a greater crash risk. The second is case control studies. We will discuss both in turn.
3.3.1 Culpability studies
3.3.1.1 Studies that do not show culpability
Some reviewers have concluded that there is no evidence that cannabis alone increases the risk of culpability for crashes, and may actually reduce risk.66 Drummer’s review of blood samples of traffic fatalities in Australia found that drivers testing positive for marijuana were actually less likely to have been judged responsible for the accident.67 Several other studies have found no increase in crash risk with cannabis.68–70 Williams’ California study of 440 male traffic accident deaths found that while alcohol use was related to crash culpability, cannabis use was not.71 Terhune’s study of 1882 motor vehicle deaths calculated an OR of 0.7 for cannabis use, 7.4 for alcohol use, and 8.4 for cannabis and alcohol use combined.68 Lowenstein and Koziol-McLain’s study of 414 injured drivers admitted to a Colorado E/R found an OR of 1.1, indicating that marijuana use was not associated with increased crash responsibility.72 Drummer’s later and more extensive ten-year study of 3400 traffic fatalities in three Australian states found that drivers with blood THC levels less than 5 ng/mL, and those with only carboxy-THC present (THC-COOH, a metabolite that is excreted in the urine for weeks and is thus more likely to indicate past use than current use), had an OR of 1.0, but those with serum levels greater than 5 ng/mL had an OR of 6.6, the same as that for a BAC of 0.15%. In all 30 cases in this study in which one driver had a serum level of THC greater than 10 ng/mL, that driver was judged to have been responsible for the accident. When marijuana was combined with alcohol, the risk was higher still.73 A later reanalysis of the same data that adjusted for the age and sex of the fatalities found that OR of crashing for cannabis use alone dropped to 0.6 (not significantly different from 1.0), versus 7.6 for alcohol.66 Laumon’s study of 10,748 French motor vehicle fatalities found that although rates of alcohol and cannabis intoxication were similar (nearly 3%), ten times as many crashes were associated with alcohol as with cannabis; however, investigators noted a dose-dependent effect on OR with increasing THC serum levels, confirming Drummer’s observation by calculating an OR of 4.72 for THC levels greater than 5 ng/mL.74 Longo’s large, well-known study of hospitalized injured drivers in South Australia showed few adverse effects of cannabis on crash risk, although there was a slightly increased risk of crashing with higher THC concentrations and a slightly lower risk with lower concentrations.75
What 5 ng/mL means in terms of actual impairment is hard to calculate, as THC levels in the blood peak quickly following inhalation then decrease rapidly according to complex pharmacokinetics, making it almost impossible to extrapolate backwards from the concentration of THC at the time of the blood test to the concentration at the time of the traffic accident. Some insight can be gained from Jones’ study of 1276 Swedish motorists arrested for DUI with blood tests positive for THC alone, which revealed an average THC blood level of 3.6 ng/mL at the time of testing.76 A similar Swiss study of 440 DUI suspects who also were positive for only THC found average blood concentrations of 5.0 ng/mL at the time of testing, indicating that a residual level of 5 ng/mL does appear to correlate with observable driving impairment earlier.77 The Swedish study also found that, of the 291 DUI arrestees who were positive for both THC and alcohol, the average THC blood level was only 2.3 ng/mL, again suggesting that lower levels of THC, when combined with alcohol, are sufficient to cause obvious impairment.76
Methodological problems often can make culpability studies hard to interpret, however. Since no study has ever shown an increased risk of road accidents among frequent marijuana smokers who are not intoxicated at the time that they drive, a positive urine test that measures levels of the long-lasting metabolite carboxy-THC but not the active ingredient THC is insufficient to classify a driver as intoxicated, as such a measure will include in the marijuana group unimpaired people who have smoked only in the past and thus artificially depress the OR.78 The Colorado study that found that marijuana use was not associated with increased crash responsibility used urine toxicology to assess drug use, so likely suffered from this limitation.72 Sampling delays in excess of an hour can cause an underestimation of THC concentration in the blood of injured drivers who test positive for marijuana, possibly explaining Longo and others’ failure to find adverse effects.
Alcohol levels, which have linear pharmacokinetics, are easier to back-calculate to the time of the accident, and are consistently linked with increased culpability in crashes.71, 75 Moreover, whereas CNS levels of alcohol, which moves easily throughout the body with little difference in concentration between compartments, can be approximated with a good degree of accuracy through measuring blood or breath levels, the same is not true of THC, which is highly lipophilic and concentrates preferentially in adipose tissue. Consequently, experimental studies have shown that functional impairment (which reaches a maximum an hour after smoking) lags behind THC blood level (which peaks within minutes and decreases rapidly thereafter).79 (Figure 1) This makes it much harder to generate blood level versus impairment curves for marijuana than it is for alcohol.
Read the Rest Here ---> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2722956/
1. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) National Center for Statistics and Analysis. 2008 [Google Scholar]
2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2008. Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQUARS) [Google Scholar]
3. Office of Applied Studies. Results from the 2005 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration; 2006. [Google Scholar]
4. Hall W, Solowij N, Lemon J. The health and psychological consequences of cannabis use. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service; 1994. [Google Scholar]
5. ElSohly M, Ross S, Mehmedic Z, Arafat R, Yi B, Banahan Br. Potency trends of delta-9-THC and other cannabinoids in confiscated marijuana from 1980–1997. Journal of Forensic Sciences. 2000;45(1):24–30. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
6. Dennis M, Babor TF, Roebuck MC, Donaldson J. Changing the focus: the case for recognizing and treating cannabis use disorders. Addiction. 2002 Dec;97 (Suppl 1):4–15. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
7. Wagner FA, Anthony JC. From first drug use to drug dependence; developmental periods of risk for dependence upon marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol. Neuropsychopharmacology. 2002 Apr;26(4):479–488. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
8. Bachman DS. Smoking cessation via telephone counseling & tools for helping your patients quit smoking once and for all. J Ark Med Soc. 1997 Sep;94(4):147–148. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
9. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Traffic Safety Facts 2000: A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General Estimates System. Washington, DC: National Center for Statistics and Analysis, U.S. Department of Transportation; 2001. [Google Scholar]
10. World Health Organization. World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 2004. [Google Scholar]
11. van den Bree MB, Pickworth WB. Risk factors predicting changes in marijuana involvement in teenagers. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2005 Mar;62(3):311–319. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
12. Subramanian R. Alcohol Involvement in Fatal Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes, 2003. Springfield, VA: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA); 2005. [Google Scholar]
13. McLean S, Parsons RS, Chesterman RB, Dineen R, Johnson MG, Davies NW. Drugs, alcohol and road accidents in Tasmania. Med J Aust. 1987 Jul 6;147(1):6–11. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
14. Soderstrom CA, Dischinger PC, Kerns TJ, Trifillis AL. Marijuana and other drug use among automobile and motorcycle drivers treated at a trauma center. Accid Anal Prev. 1995 Feb;27(1):131–135. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
15. Alvarez FJ, Fierro I, Del Rio MC. Cannabis and driving: results from a general population survey. Forensic Sci Int. 2007 Aug 6;170(2–3):111–116. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
16. Albery IP, Strang J, Gossop M, Griffiths P. Illicit drugs and driving: prevalence, beliefs and accident involvement among a cohort of current out-of-treatment drug users. Drug Alcohol Depend. 2000 Feb 1;58(1–2):197–204. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
17. Macdonald S, DeSouza A, Mann R, Chipman M. Driving behavior of alcohol, cannabis, and cocaine abuse treatment clients and population controls. Am J Drug Alcohol Abuse. 2004 May;30(2):429–444. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
18. Moskowitz H. Marihuana and driving. Accid Anal Prev. 1985 Aug;17(4):323–345. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
19. Hall W. The health and psychological consequences of cannabis use. Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service; 1994. [Google Scholar]
20. Kurzthaler I, Hummer M, Miller C, et al. Effect of cannabis use on cognitive functions and driving ability. J Clin Psychiatry. 1999 Jun;60(6):395–399. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
21. Liguori A, Gatto CP, Robinson JH. Effects of marijuana on equilibrium, psychomotor performance, and simulated driving. Behav Pharmacol. 1998 Nov;9(7):599–609. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
22. Berghaus G, Guo B. Medicines and driver fitness--findings from a meta-analysis of experimental studies as basic information to patients, physicians and experts. In: Kloeden C, McLean A, editors. Alcohol, Drugs, and Traffic Safety--T95: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffics Safety; 1995; Adelaide, Australia. 1995. pp. 295–300. [Google Scholar]
23. Foltin R, Evans S. Performance Effects of Drugs of Abuse: A Methodological Survey. Human Psychopharmacology. 1993;8:9–19. [Google Scholar]
24. Chesher G. The Effects of Alcohol and Marijuana in Combination: A Review. Alcohol, Drugs and Driving. 1986;2:105–119. [Google Scholar]
25. Hindmarch I, Kerr JS, Sherwood N. The effects of alcohol and other drugs on psychomotor performance and cognitive function. Alcohol Alcohol. 1991;26(1):71–79. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
26. Gengo FM, Gabos C, Straley C, Manning C. The pharmacodynamics of ethanol: effects on performance and judgment. J Clin Pharmacol. 1990 Aug;30(8):748–754. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
27. Irving A, Jones W. Methods for testing impairment of driving due to drugs. Eur J Clin Pharmacol. 1992;43(1):61–66. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
28. West R, Wilding J, French D, Kemp R, Irving A. Effect of low and moderate doses of alcohol on driving hazard perception latency and driving speed. Addiction. 1993 Apr;88(4):527–532. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
29. Couper F, Logan B. Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets. Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; 2004. [Google Scholar]
31. Fromme K, Katz E, D’Amico E. Effects of alcohol intoxication on the perceived consequences of risk taking. Exp Clin Psychopharmacol. 1997 Feb;5(1):14–23. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
32. MacDonald TK, MacDonald G, Zanna MP, Fong GT. Alcohol, sexual arousal, and intentions to use condoms in young men: applying alcohol myopia theory to risky sexual behavior. Health Psychol. 2000 May;19(3):290–298. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
33. Burian SE, Liguori A, Robinson JH. Effects of alcohol on risk-taking during simulated driving. Hum Psychopharmacol. 2002 Apr;17(3):141–150. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
34. Cohen J, Dearnaley EJ, Hansel CE. The risk taken in driving under the influence of alcohol. Br Med J. 1958 Jun 21;1(5085):1438–1442. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
35. Waller JA. Research needs and opportunities concerning human-environmental interactions in crashes involving alcohol. J Stud Alcohol Suppl. 1985 Jul;10:54–60. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
36. Kerr JS, Hindmarch I. The Efects of Alcohol Alone or in Combination with Other Drugs on Information Processing, Task Performance and Subjective Responses. Human Psychopharmacology. 1998;13:1–9. [Google Scholar]
37. Robbe H. Influence of Marijuana on Driving. Maastricht, The Netherlands: University of Limburg; 1994. [Google Scholar]
38. Smiley A. The Health Effects of Cannabis. In: Kalant H, editor. Marijuana: On-Road and Driving Simulator Studies. Toronto: Centre for Addiction and Mental Health; 1998. [Google Scholar]
39. Sutton LR. The effects of alcohol, marihuana and their combination on driving ability. J Stud Alcohol. 1983 May;44(3):438–445. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
40. MacDonald S, Mann R, Chipman M, et al. Driving behavior under the influence of cannabis or cocaine. Traffic Inj Prev. 2008;9(3):190–194. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
41. Robbe H, O’Hanlon J. Marijuana and actual driving performance. Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; 1993. [Google Scholar]
42. Marczinski CA, Harrison EL, Fillmore MT. Effects of alcohol on simulated driving and perceived driving impairment in binge drinkers. Alcohol Clin Exp Res. 2008 Jul;32(7):1329–1337. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
43. Smiley A. Marijuana: On-road and driving simulator studies. Alcohol, Drugs and Driving. 1986;2(3–4):121–134. [Google Scholar]
44. Smiley A. Marijuana: On-Road and Driving Simulator Studies. In: Kalant H, Corrigal W, Hall W, Smart R, editors. The Health Effects of Cannabis. Toronto: Addiction Research Foundation; 1999. pp. 173–191. [Google Scholar]
45. Smiley A, Moskowitz H, Ziedman K. Driving simulator studies of marijuana alone and in combination with alcohol. Paper presented at: 25th Conference of the American Association for Automotive Medicine; 1981. [Google Scholar]
46. Klonoff H. Marijuana and driving in real-life situations. Science. 1974 Oct 25;186(4161):317–324. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
47. Hansteen RW, Miller RD, Lonero L, Reid LD, Jones B. Effects of cannabis and alcohol on automobile driving and psychomotor tracking. Ann N Y Acad Sci. 1976;282:240–256. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
48. Sexton B, Tunbridge R, Brook-Carter N, et al. The influence of cannabis on driving. Crowthorne, UK: TRL Limited; 2000. [Google Scholar]
49. Stein A, Allen R, Cook M, Karl R. A Simulator Study of the Combined Effects of Alcohol and Marijuana on Driving Behavior. Hawthorne, CA: Systems Technology, Inc; 1983. [Google Scholar]
50. Peck R, Biasotti A, Boland P, Mallory C, Reeve V. The effects of marijuana and alcohol on actual driving performance. Alcohol, Drugs and Driving: Abstracts and Reviews 1986. 1986;2:135–154. [Google Scholar]
51. Casswell S. Cannabis and alcohol: Effects on closed-course driving behavior. Paper presented at: 7th International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs, and Traffic Safety; 1979; Melbourne, Australia. [Google Scholar]
52. Dott A. Effect of marijuana on risk acceptance in a simulated passing task. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office; 1971. [Google Scholar]
53. Ellingstad V, McFarling L, Struckman D. Alcohol, Marijuana and Risk Taking. Vermillion, DS: Vermillion Human Factors Laboratory, South Dakota University; 1973. [Google Scholar]
54. Crancer A, Jr, Dille JM, Delay JC, Wallace JE, Haykin MD. Comparison of the effects of marihuana and alcohol on simulated driving performance. Science. 1969 May 16;164(881):851–854. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
55. Rafaelsen L, Christrup H, Bech P, Rafaelsen OJ. Effects of cannabis and alcohol on psychological tests. Nature. 1973 Mar 9;242(5393):117–118. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
56. Moskowitz H, Hulbert S, McGlothlin W. Marijuana: Effects on simulated driving performance. Accid Anal Prev. 1976;8:45–50. [Google Scholar]
57. Casswell S. Cannabis and alcohol: Effects on closed-course driving behavior. Paper presented at: Seventh International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs, and Traffic Safety; 1977; Melbourne, Australia. [Google Scholar]
58. Kruger H. Low alcohol concentrations and driving. Bergisch Gladbach: Bundesanstalt fur Strassenwesen; 1990. [Google Scholar]
59. Berghaus G. Comparison of the effecvts of cannabis and alcohol from experimental studies. In: Grotenhermen F, Karus M, editors. Cannabis, Driving and Workplace. Heidelberg/New York: Springer Verlag; 2002. pp. 225–235. [Google Scholar]
60. Calhoun VD, Pekar JJ, Pearlson GD. Alcohol intoxication effects on simulated driving: exploring alcohol-dose effects on brain activation using functional MRI. Neuropsychopharmacology. 2004 Nov;29(11):2097–2017. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
61. Jones RT, Stone GC. Psychological studies of marijuana and alcohol in man. Psychopharmacologia. 1970 Aug 19;18(1):108–117. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
62. Marks DF, MacAvoy MG. Divided attention performance in cannabis users and non-users following alcohol and cannabis separately and in combination. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 1989;99(3):397–401. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
63. Wright A, Terry P. Modulation of the effects of alcohol on driving-related psychomotor skills by chronic exposure to cannabis. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 2002 Mar;160(2):213–219. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
64. Sexton B, Tunbridge R, Board A, Jackson P, Stark M, Englehart K. The influence of cannabis and alcohol on driving. Crowthorne, UK: Transport Research Laboratory; 2002. [Google Scholar]
65. Ramaekers JG, Robbe HW, O’Hanlon JF. Marijuana, alcohol and actual driving performance. Hum Psychopharmacol. 2000 Oct;15(7):551–558. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
66. Bates MN, Blakely TA. Role of cannabis in motor vehicle crashes. Epidemiol Rev. 1999;21(2):222–232. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
67. Drummer O. Inquiry into the effects o drugs (other than alcohol) on road safety in Victoria, Incorporating Selected Papers. Melbourne, Australia: LV North, Government Printer; 1995. A review of the contributions of drugs in drivers to road accident; pp. 1–28. [Google Scholar]
68. Terhune K, Ippolito C, Hendricks D, et al. The incidence and role of drugs in fatally injured drivers. Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation; 1992. [Google Scholar]
69. Drummer O. Drugs and accident risk in fatally injured drivers. Paper presented at: T95: 13th International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety; 1995; Adelaide, Australia. [Google Scholar]
70. Terhune K. An evaluation of crash culpability to assess alcohol and drug impairment effects. Paper presented at: 26th Annual Meeting, American Association for Automotive Medicine; 1982; Ontario, Canada. [Google Scholar]
71. Williams AF, Peat MA, Crouch DJ, Wells JK, Finkle BS. Drugs in fatally injured young male drivers. Public Health Rep. 1985 Jan-Feb;100(1):19–25. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
72. Lowenstein SR, Koziol-McLain J. Drugs and traffic crash responsibility: a study of injured motorists in Colorado. J Trauma. 2001 Feb;50(2):313–320. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
73. Drummer O, Gerostamoulos J, Batziris H, Chu M, Caplehorn J, Robertson M. The involvement of drugs in drivers of motor vehicles killed in Australian road traffic crashes. Accid Anal Prev. 2004;36:239–248. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
74. Laumon B, Gadegbeku B, Martin JL, Biecheler MB. Cannabis intoxication and fatal road crashes in France: population based case-control study. Bmj. 2005 Dec 10;331(7529):1371. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
75. Longo MC, Hunter CE, Lokan RJ, White JM, White MA. The prevalence of alcohol, cannabinoids, benzodiazepines and stimulants amongst injured drivers and their role in driver culpability: part ii: the relationship between drug prevalence and drug concentration, and driver culpability. Accid Anal Prev. 2000 Sep;32(5):623–632. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
76. Jones AW, Holmgren A, Kugelberg FC. Driving under the influence of cannabis: a 10-year study of age and gender differences in the concentrations of tetrahydrocannabinol in blood. Addiction. 2008 Mar;103(3):452–461. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
77. Augsburger M, Donze N, Menetrey A, et al. Concentration of drugs in blood of suspected impaired drivers. Forensic Sci Int. 2005 Oct 4;153(1):11–15. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
78. Grotenhermen F, Leson G, Berghaus G, et al. Developing limits for driving under cannabis. Addiction. 2007;102:1910–1917. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
79. Papafotiou K, Carter JD, Stough C. The relationship between performance on the standardised field sobriety tests, driving performance and the level of Delta9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in blood. Forensic Sci Int. 2005 Dec 20;155(2–3):172–178. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
80. Simpson HM, Mayhew DR, Warren RA. Epidemiology of road accidents involving young adults: alcohol, drugs and other factors. Drug Alcohol Depend. 1982 Sep;10(1):35–63. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
81. Simpson HM. Epidemiology of road accidents involving marijuana. Alcohol, Drugs and Driving. 1986;2:15–30. [Google Scholar]
82. Warren RA, Simpson HM, Hilchie J, Cimbura G, Lucas D, Bennett R. Drugs detected in fatally injured drivers in the Province of Ontario. In: Goldberg L, editor. Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety. Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist and Wiksell International; 1981. pp. 203–217. [Google Scholar]
83. Crouch DJ, Birky MM, Gust SW, et al. The prevalence of drugs and alcohol in fatally injured truck drivers. J Forensic Sci. 1993 Nov;38(6):1342–1353. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
84. Terhune K. Problems and methods in studying drug crash effects. Alcohol, Drugs and Driving. 1986;2:1–13. [Google Scholar]
85. Hunter CE, Lokan RJ, Longo M, White J, White M. The prevalence and role of alcohol, cannabinoids, benzodiazepines and stimulants in non-fatal crashes. Adelaide, Australia: Forensic Science, Department for Administrative and Information Services; 1998. [Google Scholar]
86. Movig KL, Mathijssen MP, Nagel PH, et al. Psychoactive substance use and the risk of motor vehicle accidents. Accid Anal Prev. 2004 Jul;36(4):631–636. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
87. Mathijssen MP, Movig KL, De Gier JJ, Nagel PH, van Egmond T, Egberts AC. Use of psychoactive medicines and drugs as a cause of road trauma. Paper presented at: 16th International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety T2002; 2002; Montreal, Canada. [Google Scholar]
88. Jones C, Donnelly N, Swift W, Weatherburn D. Driving under the influence of cannabis: The problem and potential countermeasures. Crime and Justice Bulletin. 2005;87:1–15. [Google Scholar]
89. Gerberich SG, Sidney S, Braun BL, Tekawa IS, Tolan KK, Quesenberry CP. Marijuana use and injury events resulting in hospitalization. Ann Epidemiol. 2003 Apr;13(4):230–237. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
90. Mura P, Kintz P, Ludes B, et al. Comparison of the prevalence of alcohol, cannabis and other drugs between 900 injured drivers and 900 control subjects: results of a French collaborative study. Forensic Sci Int. 2003 Apr 23;133(1–2):79–85. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
91. Dussault C, Brault M, Bouchard J, Lemire A. The contribution of alcohol and other drugs among fatally injured drivers in Quebec: some preliminary results. Paper presented at: 16th International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety T2002; 2002; Montreal, Canada. [Google Scholar]
92. Brault M, Dussault C, Bouchard J, Lemire A. The contribution of alcohol and other drugs among fatally injured drivers in Quebec: Final results. Paper presented at: T2004: 17th International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety; 2004; Glasgow, UK. [Google Scholar]
93. Bedard M, Dubois S, Weaver B. The impact of cannabis on driving. Can J Public Health. 2007 Jan-Feb;98(1):6–11. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
94. Robbe H, O’Hanlon J. Marijuana and Actual Driving Performance. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation; 1993. [Google Scholar]
95. Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving. Final Report; Washington, DC: Government Printing Office; 1983. [Google Scholar]
96. Donovan JE, Jessor R. Structure of problem behavior in adolescence and young adulthood. J Consult Clin Psychol. 1985 Dec;53(6):890–904. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
97. Fergusson DM, Horwood LJ. Cannabis use and traffic accidents in a birth cohort of young adults. Accid Anal Prev. 2001 Nov;33(6):703–711. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
98. Blows S, Ivers RQ, Connor J, Ameratunga S, Woodward M, Norton R. Marijuana use and car crash injury. Addiction. 2005 May;100(5):605–611. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
99. Fergusson DM, Horwood LJ, Boden JM. Is driving under the influence of cannabis becoming a greater risk to driver safety than drink driving? Findings from a longitudinal study. Accid Anal Prev. 2008 Jul;40(4):1345–1350. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
100. Mann RE, Adlaf E, Zhao J, et al. Cannabis use and self-reported collisions in a representative sample of adult drivers. J Safety Res. 2007;38(6):669–674. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
101. Kelly E, Darke S, Ross J. A review of drug use and driving: Epidemiology, impairment, risk factors and risk perceptions. Drug and Alcohol Review. 2004;23:319–344. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
102. Bierness D, Simpson H, Williams A. Role of cannabis and benzodiazepines in motor vehicle crashes. Transportation Research Circular. 2006;E-C096:12–21. [Google Scholar]
103. Moskowitz H. Commentary on variability among epidemiological studies of drugs and driving. Transportation Research Circular. 2006;E-C096:36–40. [Google Scholar]
104. Portans I, White J, Staiger P. Acute tolerance to alcohol: changes in subjective effects among social drinkers. Psychopharmacoogy. 1989;97:365–369. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
105. Cochetto D, Owens S, Perez-Reyes M, DiGuiseppi S, Miller L. Relationship Between Plasma Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol Concentration and Pharmacologic Effects in Man. Psychopharmacoogy. 1981;75:158–164. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
106. Huestis M, Henningfield J, Cone E. Blood cannabinoids. I. Absorption of THC and formation of 11-OH-THC and THCCOOH during and after smoking marijuana. J Anal Toxicol. 1992;16(5):276–282. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
DISCLAIMER This post may contain re-posted content, opinions, comments, ads, third party posts, outdated information, posts from disgruntled persons, posts from those with agendas and general internet BS. Therefore...Before you believe anything on the internet regarding anything do your research on Official Government and State Sites, Call the Michigan State Police, Check the State Attorney General Website and Consult an Attorney.